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CAR-VING OUT NOTIONS OF PRIVACY: THE
IMPACT OF GPS TRACKING AND WHY
MAYNARD IS A MOVE IN THE RIGHT
DIRECTION
In a controversial decision in 2010, the D.C. Circuit held that
warrantless GPS tracking of an automobile for an extended period of
time violates the Fourth Amendment. The D.C. Circuit approached the
issue in a novel way, using “mosaic theory” to assert that the aggregation
of information about an individual’s movements, over an extended period
of time, violated an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy. This
Note discusses how state and federal courts have dealt with warrantless
GPS tracking, and ultimately asserts that the Maynard court’s decision
was correct, insofar as it takes account of the interaction of changing
technology and shifting societal notions of privacy. This Note urges the
Supreme Court to incorporate an approach similar to Maynard within its
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. This Note concludes that failure to do
so will contract already-cramped notions of privacy in the digital age, and
facilitate a normative shift in conceptions of privacy that may be
detrimental and irreversible.
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The needs of the day have swept away much that was sacred in the
American heritage; the barriers of privacy have crumbled on
many fronts. It will be the task of the Supreme Court to attempt to
1
preserve those which are left.
I. INTRODUCTION
2

Society’s notion of privacy has evolved as civilization and
3
technology have motored on. As technology’s progress encapsulates
4
more in a smaller space (think microchips), so too has privacy become
encased in ever smaller domains. And, just as forward thinkers such as
Justices Warren and Brandeis were compelled to assert and carve out
5
privacy notions to combat what they saw as invasive technology, a new
generation should push against the continuing erosion of privacy by
technology, lest society may never get its privacy back. Nothing more
1. JACOB W. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT: A
STUDY IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 270 (1966).
2. Privacy is one of the more amorphous terms in the law, and “there is no universally
accepted philosophical definition of ‘privacy.’” Anita L. Allen, Privacy-as-Data Control:
Conceptual, Practical, and Moral Limits of the Paradigm, 32 CONN. L. REV. 861, 864 (2000).
However, Alan Westin’s definition is instructive: “Privacy is the claim of individuals, groups,
or institutions to determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent information about
them is communicated to others.” ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967). For
a well-developed synopsis of competing notions of privacy, see DANIEL J. SOLOVE & PAUL
M. SCHWARTZ, INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW 39–76 (3d ed. 2009).
3. MARTIN KUHN, FEDERAL DATAVEILLANCE: IMPLICATIONS FOR CONSTITUTIONAL
PRIVACY PROTECTIONS 11 (2007) (“During the twentieth century, conceptualizations of
privacy have gradually evolved from privacy as the right to a private, physical space to privacy
as the right to control access to and the use of personal information.”).
4. See Russell D. Covey, Pervasive Surveillance and the Future of the Fourth
Amendment, 80 MISS. L.J. 1289, 1289–94 (2011) (noting that rapid advances in technology
have occurred and will continue to; one such advance is computer chips becoming more
powerful and shrinking in size).
5. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193,
193 (1890) (“[T]he right to life has come to mean the right to enjoy life,—the right to be let
alone . . . .”). The article was a response to “snapshot cameras,” whose use along with gossiptype media was seen as invasive to guarded notions of privacy at the time. Id. at 195–96.
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succinctly displays the invasiveness of technology than the use of GPS
tracking by law enforcement (often without a warrant) to monitor every
6
movement of a person in an automobile for extended periods of time.
An example illustrates this point in more detail. In 2010, Yasir Afifi,
a twenty-year-old American citizen who is half-Egyptian, discovered a
GPS tracking device hidden in the undercarriage of his automobile
7
during a routine maintenance visit to a local garage. The discovery was
surprising for several reasons: (1) there had been no evidence that the
device was placed with a warrant; (2) there had been no specific
justification given by the FBI (who allegedly placed the device) about
8
why Afifi was being tracked; and, most striking of all, (3) the FBI
arrived shortly after Afifi’s friend posted images of the device on the
Internet and allegedly told him that they had been tracking him for three
9
10
to six months. Afifi subsequently filed a federal lawsuit, alleging that
the locational information the FBI had gathered about him detailed “the
persons with whom Mr. Afifi associated, the hospitals he attended, the
organizations of which he was a member, the religious services he
11
frequents, [and] the restaurants he went to with friends and families.”
Even without delving further into the intricacies of the Afifi case, this
discovery should raise eyebrows solely because it is a harbinger of what
is to come (and is already happening)—the warrantless tracking by law
enforcement of an individual’s every movement in an automobile for a
significant duration of time.
6. See, e.g., People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195, 1195–96 (N.Y. 2009) (“[A GPS] device
remained in place for 65 days . . . . This nonstop surveillance was conducted without a
warrant.”).
7. Kim Zetter, Caught Spying on Student, FBI Demands GPS Tracker Back, WIRED
(Oct. 7, 2010), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2010/10/fbi-tracking-device/.
8. Id. And this is not an isolated case. Afifi’s attorney stated that “after learning about
Afifi’s experience, other lawyers in her organization told her they knew of two people in Ohio
who also recently discovered tracking devices on their vehicles.” Id. The government has not
denied this practice. See Appellee’s Petition for Rehearing En Banc at 2 n.1, United States v.
Jones, 625 F.3d 766 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“Investigative agents of the United States Department
of Justice employ this method of surveillance with great frequency.”).
9. See Zetter, supra note 7.
10. Bob Egelko, San Jose Arab American Sues FBI over GPS, SFGATE.COM, Mar. 3,
2011, http://articles.sfgate.com/2011-03-03/bay-area/28648677_1_gps-device-fbi-agent-fbi-direc
tor-robert-mueller.
11. Complaint at 13, Afifi v. Holder, No. 11-00460 (D.D.C. Mar. 2, 2011). Afifi’s case
has been stayed, pending the outcome of United States v. Jones. Order Granting Plaintiff’s
Motion to Stay at 1, Afifi v. Holder, No. 11-00460 (D.D.C. Sept. 12, 2011).
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To say that this type of GPS tracking has enflamed the alreadycontentious argument about how far the government can go to prevent
12
and respond to crime would be an understatement. One need only
look to Judge Kozinski’s dissent after a denial of a rehearing en banc in
United States v. Pineda-Moreno to observe the alarm: “The needs of law
enforcement, to which my colleagues seem inclined to refuse nothing,
are quickly making personal privacy a distant memory. 1984 may have
13
come a bit later than predicted, but it’s here at last.” One could argue
that, while the warrantless electronic monitoring of automobiles might
indeed be an alarming encroachment on privacy, the Orwellian
14
rhetoric is overblown because automobile travel invariably occurs in
public, and the Supreme Court has previously held that “[a] person
traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable
15
expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to another.”
However, automobiles are a mainstay in the life of the American public
16
Use of
and are vital to its commerce and interconnectedness.
12. See Adam Cohen, Big Brother Is Watching, TIME, Sep. 13, 2010, at 53; John W.
Whitehead, GPS and the Police State We Inhabit: Living in Oceania, HUFFINGTON POST
(Sept. 28, 2010), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/john-w-whitehead/gps-and-the-police-state_b_740348.html.
13. United States vs. Pineda-Moreno, 617 F.3d 1120, 1121 (9th Cir. 2010) (Kozinski, C.J.,
dissenting), petition for cert. filed, No. 10-7515 (U.S. Nov. 10, 2010).
14. DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN THE
INFORMATION AGE 7 (2004) (“The dominant metaphor for modern invasions of privacy is
Big Brother, the ruthless totalitarian government in George Orwell’s novel 1984.”). Big
Brother’s totalitarian government attempts to wipe out privacy notions by using various
forms of surveillance, “constantly monitoring and spying” on its citizens, who have no way to
know if they are being watched. Id. at 29. Orwell and dystopia have been invoked by many
courts and commentators in reference to GPS tracking. See United States v. Cuevas-Perez,
640 F.3d 272, 275–76 (7th Cir. 2011) (stating that GPS is “a technology surely capable of
abuses fit for a dystopian novel”); Phillip R. Sumpter, Note, Is Big Brother Watching You?
United States v. Pineda-Moreno and the Ninth Circuit’s Dismantling of the Fourth
Amendment’s Protections, 2011 BYU L. REV. 209, 209–10 (2011) (arguing that the court in
Pineda-Moreno was “enabling the creation of a modern-day Oceania”); David Kravets, Judge
Calls Location-Tracking Orwellian, While Congress Moves to Legalize It, WIRED (Aug. 24,
2011), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2011/08/gps-privacy-crossroads/.
15. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983). While “location information is not
actually held by another,” this statement is generally an extension of the “third party
doctrine,” which states that “a person retains no expectation of privacy in information
conveyed to another.” Stephen E. Henderson, The Timely Demise of the Fourth Amendment
Third Party Doctrine, 96 IOWA L. REV. BULL. 39, 39–40, 43 (2011); see also FRED H. CATE,
PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 58 (1997); Covey, supra note 4, at 1295.
16. In 1960, there were over 60 million passenger cars on the road. As of 2008, this
number had more than doubled, to over 137 million. BUREAU OF TRANSP. STAT., U.S.
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automobiles is inexorably intertwined with the path that an individual’s
17
life takes each day. It is not hard to argue, then, that by watching
where an individual goes in an automobile, one can paint a precise
picture of that individual’s life. As the court noted in United States v.
Maynard,
[this] type[] of information can . . . reveal more about a person
than . . . any individual trip viewed in isolation. Repeated visits
to a church, a gym, a bar, or a bookie tell a story not told by any
single visit, as does one’s not visiting any of these places . . . .
The sequence of a person’s movements can reveal still more; a
single trip to a gynecologist’s office tells little about a woman,
but that trip followed a few weeks later by a visit to a baby
supply store tells a different story. A person who knows all of
another’s travels can deduce whether he is a weekly church goer,
a heavy drinker, a regular at the gym, an unfaithful husband, an
outpatient receiving medical treatment, an associate of particular
individuals or political groups—and not just one such fact about
18
a person, but all such facts.
Surveillance of this sort necessarily raises a critical question: Does a
person have a reasonable expectation of privacy in all of his movements
19
over a delineated course of time? And who determines what amount
of time is presumptively reasonable or unreasonable—i.e., when is the
20
government overreaching? Finally, what determinative test or rule
DEP’T TRANSP., NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION STATISTICS 2011, at tbl.1-11 (2011), available
at http://www.bts.gov/publications/national_transportation_statistics/pdf/entire.pdf.
17. This has been due to the shift from agricultural jobs to factories and offices, which
have shifted work farther away from home. This has necessarily had an effect on society’s
notion of privacy. See Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1087,
1129–43 (2002).
18. United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 562 (D.C. Cir. 2010), reh’g denied en banc
sub nom. United States v. Jones, 625 F.3d 766 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 671
(2010), cert. granted sub nom. United States v. Jones, 131 S. Ct. 3064 (2011), and aff’d on other
grounds, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012) (emphasis added).
19. The concept of a “reasonable expectation of privacy” with regard to Fourth
Amendment searches was first raised by Justice Harlan’s concurring opinion in Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 360–61 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
20. One time-based suggestion has been twenty-four hours. See CONST. PROJECT
LIBERTY & SEC. COMM., LIBERTY AND SECURITY COMMITTEE STATEMENT ON LOCATION
TRACKING 5 (2001), available at http://www.constitutionproject.org/pdf/LocationTrackingRe
port.pdf. However, due to the particular nuances of criminal investigations, a time-based
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exists to assert that “dragnet-type” surveillance is actually occurring and
is violating the Fourth Amendment’s proscription against unreasonable
21
searches? Although the focus in answering these questions may be on
GPS tracking at the moment, more advanced technology that may not
need to be attached to an automobile to facilitate prolonged surveillance
is surely on the horizon. Thus, any solution to this problem must be
significantly forward thinking to combat the slow creep toward
22
becoming an increasingly panoptic society.
Courts at both the state and federal level have wrestled with the
23
questions raised above, with disparate results failing to provide clarity.
24
Because this issue is constitutional and has given rise to a circuit split,
the Supreme Court granted the petition for certiorari in Maynard to
25
rectify the split. During the publication of this Note, the Court decided
United States v. Jones; however, the focus here will not be on the Jones

approach should be viewed with caution because it could seriously impede legitimate and
necessary investigatory processes that may not be able to culminate within that time.
21. The holding in Knotts reserved judgment on the Fourth Amendment implications of
“‘twenty-four hour surveillance of any citizen of this country,’” noting that “if such dragnettype law enforcement practices . . . should eventually occur, there will be time enough then to
determine whether different constitutional principles may be applicable.” Knotts, 460 U.S. at
283–84.
22. The Panopticon was “the antithesis of public anonymity[,] . . . a model prison first
imagined by Jeremy Bentham.” CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY AT RISK: THE NEW
GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 92–93 (2007) (citing
JEREMY BENTHAM, PANOPTICON; OR, THE INSPECTION-HOUSE (1787), reprinted in 4 THE
WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 37–172 (John Bowring ed., Russell & Russell, Inc. 1962)
(1843). While it was imagined as a prison, the total surveillance state it creates and the
disciplinary mechanism that it enforces have together been interpreted as a way to control
society, as well. MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON
208–09 (Alan Sheridan trans., Vintage Books ed. 1979); see also SOLOVE, supra note 14, at
30–31 (“[T]he Panopticon is not merely limited to the prison or to a specific architectural
structure—it is a technology of power that can be used in many contexts and in a multitude of
ways.”).
23. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 7–13, Pineda-Moreno v. United States, No.
10-7515 (U.S. Nov. 10, 2010) (discussing both the Federal Circuit Court split as well as the
conflicting decisions in various state courts).
24. Id. at 8 (“Four circuit court opinions demonstrate conflict and growing inconsistency
in the federal courts on the issue of Fourth Amendment protection in cases of GPS
monitoring.”).
25. United States v. Jones, 131 S. Ct. 3064 (2011); see also Orin Kerr, Supreme Court
Agrees to Review Case on GPS and the Fourth Amendment, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Jun. 27,
2011),
http://volokh.com/2011/06/27/supreme-court-agrees-to-review-case-on-gps-and-thefourth-amendment/ [hereinafter Kerr, Supreme Court].
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26

holding. Rather, this Note’s primary focus will be on Maynard and
other recent federal court cases that deal with Fourth Amendment
issues under the the reasonable expectation of privacy test. State court
examples will be used to illustrate the general issue, as they have helped
to guide the federal courts. Additionally, it is presumed that the reader
is familiar with GPS technology, insofar as it applies to tracking the
27
movements of an automobile, and its admission as evidence. While it
has also been argued that tracking via GPS can be halted by asserting
that placement of the GPS tracker on someone’s automobile is a seizure
28
under the Fourth Amendment, this Note will focus solely on the issue
26. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). Unfortunately, the holding fails to
clearly delimit the strictures of the Fourth Amendment when dealing with technology, opting
instead to take an undeniably originalist approach to the question (through notions of
trespass). Id. Consequently, the door has still been left wide open for mosaic theory to
become part of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, and at least one commentator has argued
that the concurrences in Jones give the impression that some Justices (possibly even five) may
be ready to embrace it. See Orin Kerr, What’s the Status of the Mosaic Theory After Jones?,
VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Jan. 23, 2012), http://volokh.com/2012/01/23/whats-the-status-of-themosaic-theory-after-jones/. Both Justices Alito and Sotomayor, in their concurrences, used
Maynard-esque language, without actually adopting (or rejecting) Maynard, and they both
reserved the issue of when (temporally) GPS tracking becomes an unreasonable search.
Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 955–56 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 962–64 (Alito, J., concurring in
the judgment). Justice Alito stated, “We need not identify with precision the point at which
the tracking of this vehicle became a search, for the line was surely crossed before the 4-week
mark.” Id. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment). In her concurrence, Justice
Sotomayor agreed with Justice Alito’s conclusion that “‘longer term GPS monitoring in
investigations of most offenses impinges on expectations of privacy.’” Id. at 955 (Sotomayor,
J. concurring) (quoting id. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment)).
The Maynard court offered a novel answer to the reserved question. I will focus on
Maynard’s novel resolution of this issue and where I think Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
should go. Thus, despite Jones being resolved, the analysis in this Note is not moot;
alternatively, the Jones decision leaves Fourth Amendment jurisprudence muddied and still
ripe for reform to properly address changing technology.
27. See generally Nathan J. Buchok, Plotting a Course for GPS Evidence, Note, 28
QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 1019, 1020 (2010) (examining the use of GPS technology as applied
under the Federal Rules of Evidence, ultimately concluding that “GPS technology . . . is
reliable enough for use at trial”); Sarah Rahter, Privacy Implications of GPS Tracking
Technology, Note, 4 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 755 (2008).
28. Many cases on both the state and federal level have also addressed Fourth
Amendment seizure relating to the installation of GPS monitors on automobiles. See United
States v. Jones, 625 F.3d 766, 770 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (noting that
Fourth Amendment seizure issue raised by defendant “poses an important question and
deserves careful consideration by the en banc court”); United States v. McIver, 186 F.3d 1119,
1127 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that placement of magnetized tracking devices did not deprive
owner of dominion and control and thus “no seizure occurred because the officers did not
meaningfully interfere with [the defendant’s] possessory interest in the [vehicle]”);
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of whether doing so constitutes a Fourth Amendment search. This
narrow scope is necessary because GPS tracking and prolonged
surveillance must be addressed under the reasonable expectation of
privacy standard governing searches, lest we wish to revisit this
argument once new technology emerges and tracking no longer requires
a device to be physically attached to a vehicle—a necessary corollary if
resolution is based on seizure. Lastly, there may also be federal
legislative methods to address the issue of GPS tracking; indeed, at least
29
two bills have been proposed, and commentators have suggested this
30
This Note, however, will focus narrowly on a judicial
approach.
solution.
Commonwealth v. Connolly, 913 N.E.2d 356, 369 (Mass. 2009) (“[A]part from the installation
of the GPS device, the police use of the defendant’s minivan to conduct GPS monitoring for
their own purposes constituted a seizure.”). Justice Stevens has also stated more generally
that “[i]n my opinion the surreptitious use of a radio transmitter—whether it contains a
microphone or merely a signalling device—on an individual’s personal property is both a
seizure and a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.” United States v. Karo,
468 U.S. 705, 728 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting). The question of seizure was before the
Supreme Court, at its behest, in United States v. Jones, 131 S. Ct. 3064 (2011) (“[I]n addition
to the question presented by the petition, the parties are directed to brief and argue the
following question: ‘Whether the government violated respondent’s Fourth Amendment
rights by installing the GPS tracking device on his vehicle without a valid warrant and without
his consent.’” (emphasis added)). This question could rein in the practice of warrantless GPS
tracking by invoking the Fifth Amendment instead of the Fourth. See Kerr, Supreme Court,
supra note 25.
29. Senator Ron Wyden and U.S. Representative Jason Chaffetz authored the GPS Act,
which requires, inter alia, that law enforcement obtain a warrant before GPS tracking could
be used. H.R. 2168, 112th Cong. (2011); S. 1212, 112th Cong. (2011). Senator Patrick Leahy
has also introduced legislation that requires a warrant for GPS tracking, however, his
proposal would amend the Electronics Communications Privacy Act (ECPA). S. 1011, 112th
Cong. (2011).
30. See Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional
Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 802–07 (2004) [hereinafter Kerr, New
Technologies] (“[C]ourts should place a thumb on the scale in favor of judicial caution when
technology is in flux, and should consider allowing legislatures to provide the primary rules
governing law enforcement investigations involving new technologies.”); Kimberly C. Smith,
Comment, Hiding in Plain Sight: Protection from GPS Technology Requires Congressional
Action, Not a Stretch of the Fourth Amendment, 62 MERCER L. REV. 1243, 1276–78 (2011).
However, legislative action is not without its detractors. See Daniel J. Solove, Fourth
Amendment Codification and Professor Kerr’s Misguided Call for Judicial Deference, 74
FORDHAM L. REV. 747 (2005). Solove argues that “[w]here the courts have left open areas
for legislative rules to fill in, Congress has created an uneven fabric of protections that is
riddled with holes and that has weak protections in numerous places. Therefore, Kerr’s claim
that legislatures create more comprehensive and balanced rules than courts is simply not
borne out by the evidence.” Id. at 766.
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This Note asserts that the Maynard court’s interpretation of the
reasonable expectation of privacy through the “mosaic theory” is the
type of interpretation that the Supreme Court should incorporate into
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, and that prolonged GPS tracking
31
without a warrant is a violation of the Fourth Amendment.
This
interpretation will be justified by using the Supreme Court’s Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence, applicable federal decisions, and relevant
legal commentary. This Note concludes that “mosaic theory” is a move
in the right direction by illustrating that other interpretations and
current judicial precedent are not sufficiently forward thinking to
survive the onward march of technology.
Part II of the Note surveys the Fourth Amendment legal landscape
as it currently stands, articulating Supreme Court jurisprudence
regarding the reasonable expectation of privacy. Part III delves into the
recent state and federal appellate court decisions and their conflicting
interpretations of how GPS tracking comports with Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence and state constitutions. Part IV focuses on the Maynard
decision and its use of “mosaic theory” to define the reasonable
expectation of privacy. Part V argues that the Maynard approach to the
reasonable expectation of privacy is a move in the right direction and
may assist in curtailing the inevitable shrinking of privacy that continues
to occur as technology advances. Part VI concludes by positing that the
Supreme Court should build upon the Maynard court’s interpretation of
privacy and include that interpretation, or a forward-thinking analogue,
within its Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
II. FOURTH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE—REASONABLE
EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY WITH RESPECT TO “SENSE-ENHANCING”
TECHNOLOGY
A. The Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Test
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution states in
pertinent part as follows: “The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
32
seizures, shall not be violated.” The Fourth Amendment would seem
to not even address the issue of surreptitious tracking because it does
31. Maynard, 615 F.3d at 562–63. For an explanation of Maynard, see infra Part IV.
32. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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not affect the security of people in their “houses, papers, and effects,”
language that on its face seems to contemplate the invasion of
33
something physical; however, the Supreme Court has construed this
language in the Fourth Amendment quite expansively to include non34
physical intrusion.
Typically, a non-physical intrusion occurs by
“sense-augmenting” or “extrasensory” tools that allow us to ascertain
35
information beyond which one’s normal human senses would permit.
The Court has addressed the use of these tools by law enforcement
36
almost thirty times since 1927. Indeed, its interpretation has evolved as
37
the Court has been confronted with novel challenges and technologies.
The genesis of non-physical invasion violating the Fourth Amendment
38
began in Katz v. United States. There, the defendant was a gambler
who placed wagers with a bookie, who was across state lines, via
39
telephone from a particular telephone booth.
The FBI placed a
listening device on the outside of the phone booth to record his
40
conversations. The government argued that the method of obtaining
the evidence did not violate the Fourth Amendment because “the
surveillance technique they employed involved no physical penetration
41
of the telephone booth from which the petitioner placed his calls.” The
33. Prior to 1967, the Fourth Amendment was grounded only in property rights, and it
protected only tangible objects from physical invasion. THOMAS K. CLANCY, THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT: ITS HISTORY AND INTERPRETATION 53–55 (2008).
34. Richard G. Wilkins, Defining the ‘Reasonable Expectation of Privacy’: An Emerging
Tripartite Analysis, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1077, 1114–28 (1987) (“[T]he presence or absence of a
physical intrusion ostensibly ceased to be the focal point of [F]ourth [A]mendment
analysis.”).
35. Renée McDonald Hutchins, Tied Up in Knotts? GPS Technology and the Fourth
Amendment, 55 UCLA L. REV. 409, 432–33 (2007). According to Hutchins, “[s]enseaugmenting surveillance refers to surveillance that reveals information that could
theoretically be attained through one of the five human senses.” Id. She goes on to state that
“[e]xtrasensory surveillance . . . is that which reveals information otherwise indiscernible to
the unaided human senses.” Id. at 433.
36. Id. at 423.
37. See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33–34 (2001) (acknowledging that the
Fourth Amendment has not been “entirely unaffected by the advance of technology” when
faced with a novel thermal imaging case).
38. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). Katz was a direct refutation of Olmstead
v. United States, where the court held that the Fourth Amendment applied only to material
things. 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928).
39. Katz, 389 U.S. at 348.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 352.
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Court rejected this argument, and the narrow application of previous
42
case law, holding that the Fourth Amendment could be violated by
actions that did not involve any physical intrusion—“Wherever a man
may be, he is entitled to know that he will remain free from
43
unreasonable searches and seizures.” The Court explained that
the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a
person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or
office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But
what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible
44
to the public, may be constitutionally protected.
While the holding in Katz was revolutionary for its expansive
reading of the Fourth Amendment, it is more important today because
Justice Harlan’s concurrence annunciated the test a court should use to
determine if a non-physical invasion has violated the Fourth
45
Amendment.
At the outset of his opinion, Justice Harlan set the
constitutional floor, explaining that “a person has a constitutionally
46
protected reasonable expectation of privacy.” He further stated that a
solely physical test was misplaced and was “bad physics as well as bad
law, for reasonable expectations of privacy may be defeated by
47
electronic as well as physical invasion.”
Thus, he stated that to
determine if the Fourth Amendment is implicated, there is “a twofold
requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective)
42. See supra text accompanying note 38.
43. Katz, 389 U.S. at 359.
44. Id. at 351–52 (citation omitted). Removing the physical intrusion element pushed
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence away from trespass doctrine, widening its scope and
arguably expanding its open texture. See Amy L. Peikoff, Pragmatism and Privacy, 5 N.Y.U.
J.L. & LIBERTY 638, 657 (2010) (“[Justice] Stewart, like Brandeis and Douglas before him,
want[ed] to disengage the notion of a Fourth Amendment ‘search’ from any remnant of the
trespass doctrine. He, too, want[ed] to keep as many options open as possible, with respect to
what does or does not constitute a search.”). While Katz was a push away from a propertybased notion, its approach has been criticized as well. See Lewis R. Katz, In Search of a
Fourth Amendment for the Twenty-First Century, 65 IND. L.J. 549, 564 (1990) (arguing that
Katz is now merely an assumption of the risk doctrine, based on the language “‘knowingly
expose[d] to the public,’” and that Katz actually takes away Fourth Amendment protections
in a “high-tech society”).
45. Katz, 389 U.S. at 360–62 (Harlan, J., concurring).
46. Id. at 360.
47. Id. at 362.
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expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that
48
society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”
The Katz test thus has two parts: (1) that the individual exhibits a
subjective expectation of privacy; and (2) that society is prepared to
49
recognize the individual’s expectation as objectively reasonable. The
first part of the test can be satisfied by the individual’s showing
50
affirmative steps to protect his or her own privacy, like concealing
items in a locked glove box, putting up high walls on their property, or
not publicly listing their telephone number. These affirmative steps
have an outward element, allowing clear resolution of the first part of
the Katz test. The second part of the test—society’s acceptance of the
expectation as reasonable—has been weighed much more heavily by
51
courts and is more often contested.
It has been argued that the
uncertainty in this regard has resulted from the nature and extent of
“the methods used by government to intrude into private places; . . .
[the] privacy interests [that may exist in] a broad range of places and
activities; and . . . the role that modern technology plays in enabling the
government to intrude into places and activities that previously were
52
inaccessible.”
Thus, while Katz “revolutionized Fourth Amendment search
53
analysis” and “laid to rest most of the criticism that the law had
become stilted and anachronistic in its attempts to accommodate
modern investigative technology,” it was still often problematic in
54
55
application, and at times even criticized by the Court itself.
Accordingly, although the Supreme Court has ruled numerous times on

48. Id. at 361.
49. Id.
50. Hutchins, supra note 35, at 428 (“[T]he Court has found that affirmative steps like
erecting fences and packaging contraband in closed luggage are sufficient to satisfy the first
prong of Katz.”).
51. See Bennett L. Gershman, Privacy Revisited: GPS Tracking as Search and Seizure, 30
PACE L. REV. 927, 928–29 (2010).
52. Id. at 929.
53. Wilkins, supra note 34, at 1087. This is a decidedly non-originalist interpretation of
the Fourth Amendment. See Justin F. Marceau, The Fourth Amendment at a Three-Way
Stop, 62 ALA. L. REV. 687, 687–712 (2011). Marceau noted that “[i]nsofar as the Katz model
of Fourth Amendment review reflects a rejection of stagnation and history, the Fourth
Amendment represents an ongoing indignity to strict originalism.” Id. at 710.
54. Wilkins, supra note 34, at 1087–88.
55. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740–41 n.5 (1979).
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56

this issue, its interpretations have often been muddled, and the
resulting precedent more resembles a case-by-case, ad hoc approach
57
than a hard and fast legal standard that is consistently adhered to. As
one commentator has noted, “the highly elastic boundaries of the
‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ test ma[d]e judicial construction of
58
the [Fourth Amendment] quite haphazard.”
This erratic nature is
evidenced in the cases that follow, and the varied interpretations to
which commentators have ascribed.
B. More Recent Application of the Reasonable Expectation of Privacy to
Technology
The Katz decision established the reasonable expectation of privacy
test as the measure that later courts would use to evaluate searches
under the Fourth Amendment. But technology moved further still. In
1983, the Court had its first opportunity to address devices that facilitate
59
tracking of subjects through surreptitious means.
In United States v. Knotts, the defendant was charged with
60
“conspiracy to manufacture a controlled substance” after one of the codefendants was reported by his employer for stealing chemicals that
61
“could be used in manufacturing illicit drugs,” including chloroform.
Law enforcement officers placed a beeper (radio transmitter) in a
62
chloroform container that was sold to the defendant. Officers then
followed the subject, using both visual surveillance and monitoring of
the beeper signal, to discover where the defendant was delivering the
63
chemicals. While the police were following the defendant, he began
making evasive maneuvers, and the police stopped their pursuit and lost
56. See Hutchins, supra note 35, at 423.
57. See Orin S. Kerr, Four Models of Fourth Amendment Protection, 60 STAN. L. REV.
503, 504–05 (2007) [hereinafter Kerr, Four Models] (noting that “the meaning of the phrase
‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ remains remarkably opaque” and stating, amusingly, that
some Fourth Amendment scholars “suggest that the only way to identify when an expectation
of privacy is reasonable is when five Justices say so”). However, Kerr does go on to state that
the Supreme Court’s precedent fits within four distinct approaches—an attempt to provide
some clarity. Id. at 506.
58. Wilkins, supra note 34, at 1088.
59. See generally United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
60. Id. at 277.
61. Id. at 278.
62. Id.
63. Id.
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64

visual contact. Despite the fact that the police were no longer able to
follow the defendant on the ground, they were able to use a helicopter
equipped with a monitoring device to locate the signal of the beeper and
65
thus able to determine where the defendant had travelled.
The
defendant argued that tracking him using a beeper violated his
reasonable expectation of privacy, and all evidence derived from it
66
should be suppressed.
The Supreme Court disagreed with the
defendant, and held that the use of the beeper did not violate the Fourth
67
Amendment.
At the outset, the Court noted that “[t]he governmental surveillance
conducted by means of the beeper in this case amounted principally to
68
the following of an automobile on public streets and highways.” The
Court was in essence analogizing the use of the beeper to another way
69
to follow an automobile and perform visual surveillance.
More
germane to the Fourth Amendment argument, the Court stated that “[a]
person travelling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no
reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to
70
another.”
Further, the Court said that “[n]othing in the Fourth
Amendment prohibited the police from augmenting the sensory
faculties bestowed upon them at birth with such enhancement as science
71
and technology afforded them in this case.”
However, despite
appearing to be highly deferential to the use of technology by law
enforcement, the Court’s reasoning was not without qualification.
Responding to the defendant’s argument that a verdict for the
government would allow “twenty-four hour surveillance of any citizen
72
of this country,” the Court proceeded cautiously, noting that “if such
dragnet-type law enforcement practices as respondent envisions should
eventually occur, there will be time enough then to determine whether
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 279.
67. Id. at 285.
68. Id. at 281.
69. See Tarik N. Jallad, Old Answers to New Questions: GPS Surveillance and the
Unwarranted Need for Warrants, 11 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 351, 362 (2010) (“[T]he Court stated
that the beeper tracking was akin to the physical following of the automobile on public
roads.”).
70. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281.
71. Id. at 282.
72. Id. at 283 (internal quotations omitted).
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73

different constitutional principles may be applicable.” This reservation
of judgment on “dragnet-type law enforcement practices” has become
the focal point of later cases grappling with technology that can arguably
do such dragnet-type observation.
Justice Steven’s concurrence in Knotts was much narrower and
74
carefully limited to the facts before the Court. He noted that in Katz,
the Court held that the Fourth Amendment does inhibit police from
75
augmenting their sensory abilities with technological advancements.
He argued, however, that just because “the augmentation in this case
was unobjectionable, it by no means follows that the use of electronic
76
detection techniques does not implicate especially sensitive concerns,”
a recognition that not all searches accomplished through technological
advances may be constitutional in the future.
Indeed, the Supreme Court eventually determined, years later, in
Kyllo v. United States, that the reasonable expectation of privacy was
violated when police used a device to search a defendant’s home,
reasoning that the device used was not available to the public, provided
77
extrasensory abilities, and invaded the protected space of the home. In
Kyllo, the government used a thermal imager to see the heat generated
in areas of the defendant’s home; the government used the imager to
determine if the defendant was growing marijuana through the use of
78
heat lamps. Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia noted at the outset
that “[i]t would be foolish to contend that the degree of privacy secured
to citizens by the Fourth Amendment has been entirely unaffected by
79
the advance of technology.” The Court found that use of the device
provided the police extrasensory abilities, and despite being used from a
public space out in front of the house, its revelations about what
occurred inside the house, including lawful activities, were an invasion
73. Id. at 284.
74. Id. at 288 (Stevens, J., concurring).
75. Id.
76. Id. The Supreme Court appeared ready to accept Justice Stevens’ words, at least
somewhat so, in Karo, where the Court held that use of a beeper to track a person while they
are in their home is a search under the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Karo, 486 U.S.
705, 714 (1984). However, the Court’s decision is more a gesture of deference to the privacy
in the home, like Kyllo, than a condemnation of technological surveillance. See Kerr, New
Technologies, supra note 30, at 831–36; see infra note 82.
77. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001).
78. Id. at 29–30.
79. Id. at 33–34.
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of the reasonable expectation of privacy that one has within his or her
80
home.
While Kyllo would appear quite favorable to defendants in cases
involving any device that bestowed extrasensory gifts on the would-be
discoverer (i.e., the police), it has been read more as a decision fortifying
privacy protection within the home and less a decision limiting the use
81
of extrasensory technology. But this decision has provided a basis for
the argument that the location of the search alone should not demarcate
82
the beginning or end of privacy. Notably, Justice Scalia’s decision
appears to be forward thinking on its surface, stating that “[w]hile the
technology used in the present case was relatively crude, the rule we
adopt must take account of more sophisticated systems that are already
83
in use or are in development.”
At the heart of Kyllo, though, is a formulaic inquiry that “can cause
constitutional protections to rise or fall on the talismanic incantation of
84
the sense-augmenting or extrasensory categories.” This classification
80. Id. at 40. Justice Stevens disagreed about the scope of the rule, stating “[c]learly, a
rule that is designed to protect individuals from the overly intrusive use of sense-enhancing
equipment should not be limited to a home.” Id. at 48 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
81. See Tracey Maclin, Katz, Kyllo, and Technology: Virtual Fourth Amendment
Protection in the Twenty-First Century, 72 MISS. L.J. 51, 116–23 (2002); April A. Otterberg,
Note, GPS Tracking Technology: The Case for Revisiting Knotts and Shifting the Supreme
Court’s Theory of the Public Space Under the Fourth Amendment, 46 B.C. L. REV. 661, 692–
93 (2005). This deference to home protection was also the deciding factor in Karo. See supra
text accompanying note 76. Some of the criticism of Kyllo arises because of this focus on the
home, and the narrowness of the holding—the general result being that we are still left with
the Katz test. See Peikoff, supra note 44, at 662–71; supra text accompanying note 80.
82. See Otterberg, supra note 81, at 694 (“[L]anguage in Kyllo . . . suggests the Court is
beginning to recognize that technology often antiquates a Fourth Amendment analysis based
purely on physical boundaries.”); see also Kerr, New Technologies, supra note 30, at 838–39.
Professor Kerr argues that
A “reasonable expectation of privacy” has not been equated with the expectation of
privacy of a reasonable person; rather, it has been used as a term of art based
heavily on property law principles. As a result, existing Fourth Amendment rules
are not necessarily the rules that sensible legislators might enact and reasonable
citizens might desire. Especially in the area of high technology, the property-based
Fourth Amendment does not guarantee that the rules governing law enforcement
are optimal rules that effectively balance the competing concerns of privacy and
effective law enforcement.
Id. at 838.
83. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 36.
84. Hutchins, supra note 35, at 437.
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has been heavily relied on in later cases, and if the Court has found that
certain technology is merely sense-augmenting, that finding has typically
85
(but not always) led the Court to uphold use of the technology.
However, this bright line determination should not be functionally
dispositive of a violation of the reasonable expectation of privacy, as
“the quantity of information that the technology can potentially disclose
is also a critical component in assessing its proper constitutional
86
treatment.”
While Kyllo makes a somewhat convincing push toward the senseaugmenting or extrasensory dichotomy, this distinction is not fully
87
explicative of the current law.
Thus, Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence has also been viewed more simply as relying on an
88
“inside/outside” distinction. Essentially, anything that is “outside” is
subject to surveillance by the government, and is not a search, but
anything “inside” is more heavily scrutinized, and often ends up a
85. Id. at 432–38.
86. Id. at 438. For an argument that Kyllo’s bright line rules will indeed be fleeting, see
Maclin, supra note 81, at 107–16.
87. For example, in United States v. Place, the court found that a canine sniff was not a
search, even though this extends human senses beyond their capabilities. 462 U.S. 696, 707
(1983). However, the court labeled dog sniffs as “sui generis,” and the “search” was
extremely narrow because only illegal contraband was revealed, so the holding in this case is
somewhat cabined. Id. (“We are aware of no other investigative procedure that is so limited
both in the manner in which the information is obtained and in the content of the information
revealed by the procedure.”); see also CLANCY, supra note 33, at 308. Despite the sui generis
label, Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, was still not comfortable with the
implication of the holding in Place, stating that
the use of electronic detection techniques that enhance human perception
implicates “especially sensitive concerns.” Obviously, a narcotics detection dog is
not an electronic detection device. Unlike the electronic “beeper” in Knotts,
however, a dog does more than merely allow the police to do more efficiently what
they could do using only their own senses. A dog adds a new and previously
unobtainable dimension to human perception. The use of dogs, therefore,
represents a greater intrusion into an individual’s privacy. Such use implicates
concerns that are at least as sensitive as those implicated by the use of certain
electronic detection devices.
Place, 462 U.S. at 719–20 (Brennan, J., concurring) (internal citation omitted). This decision
was upheld, post-Kyllo. See Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005). The Court distinguished
the Caballes case from Kyllo by noting that the thermal-imaging device in Kyllo also exposed
lawful activity, which is fundamentally different than hoping or expecting that illegal
contraband will not be discovered. Id. at 409–10.
88. Orin S. Kerr, Applying the Fourth Amendment to the Internet: A General Approach,
62 STAN. L. REV. 1005, 1009–12 (2010) [hereinafter Kerr, Applying the Fourth Amendment].
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search. Stated a slightly different way, anything observable with the
naked eye (or in plain view) does not garner Fourth Amendment
89
protection. This approach somewhat adeptly explains the Supreme
Court’s holdings in other Fourth Amendment cases: in Kyllo, the
technology revealed something in a house, so it was a search; in Karo,
the beeper went into a house, so it was a search; in Knotts, the beeper
never invaded a private space, so it was not a search. The Court has
ruled along the same lines in other Fourth Amendment cases as well.
For example, the Court has held that aerial observation is not a search
90
because the public flying over the same spot could have seen the same;
analyzing garbage left on the street is not a search because it is in plain
91
view; but manipulation of a bag, above and beyond simple observation,
92
is a search.
The cases and approaches above provide the framework within
which the GPS tracking question must be addressed, but the holes are
obvious. The GPS issue prods the unresolved Fourth Amendment issue
about how new technology interacts within the existing framework, and
has pushed the somewhat amorphous precedent to the point of near
inflexibility. At one extreme is Knotts, providing that anything a person
does in public in an automobile is subject to no protection; at the other
is Kyllo, suggesting that advanced technology may trigger Fourth
Amendment protection because of its extrasensory characteristics.
However, it is unclear if Kyllo’s holding can be extended outside the
93
home.

89. See Christopher Slobogin, Peeping Techno-Toms and the Fourth Amendment: Seeing
Through Kyllo’s Rules Governing Technological Surveillance, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1393, 1410
(2002); see also Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375 (1993) (“[I]f contraband is left in
open view and is observed by a police officer from a lawful vantage point, there has been no
invasion of a legitimate expectation of privacy and thus no ‘search’ within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment.”). The Respondent’s brief in United States v. Jones attempts to chip
away at this notion, with respect to GPS. Brief for Respondent at 11, 29, United States v.
Jones, 131 S. Ct. 3064 (2011) (No. 10-1259). The Respondent noted that “the government’s
GPS device generated and stored a unique form and quality of data that was not exposed to
the naked eye,” id. at 11, and that the “location and velocity calculations [that GPS provides]
are materially different from what the human eye observes.” id. at 29.
90. See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 450–52 (1989); Dow Chem. Co. v. United States,
476 U.S. 227, 238–39 (1986); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 215 (1986).
91. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40 (1988).
92. Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 338–39 (2000).
93. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983); Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 35–36.
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III. STATE AND FEDERAL APPELLATE LAW ON THE USE OF GPS
TRACKING TECHNOLOGY, PRE-MAYNARD
A. Survey of State Law Influence on GPS Tracking
Preliminarily, it should be noted that nine states have enacted
94
statutes to address warrantless GPS tracking. At least ten other states
have faced the issue judicially, and they are almost evenly split over
whether a warrant is required to use GPS tracking as an investigative
95
tool. Because of the lack of guidance at the federal level with respect
96
to this issue, these cases have often turned on factual nuances and state
constitutional interpretation, instead of judicial precedent.
Additionally, because state courts are free to interpret their own
constitutions more broadly than the baseline protections that the United
States Constitution provides, state court decisions are only informative
to the extent that they provide judicial perspective on potential federal
94. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 637.7 (West 2010); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1335 (2010);
FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 934.06, 934.42 (West 2010); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 803-42, 803-44.7 (West
2010); MINN. STAT. §§ 626A.37, 626A.35 (2010); OKLA. STAT. tit. 13, §§ 176.6, 177.6 (2010);
18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5761 (2010); S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-30-140 (2010); UTAH CODE ANN.
§§ 77-23a-4, 77-23a-7, 77-23a-15.5 (West 2010). The Delaware statute does contain an
exception for “lawful use of an electronic tracking device by a law enforcement officer.”
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1335(a)(8). “Lawful use” is extremely ambiguous; however, one
court in Delaware has interpreted that statement to require a warrant. See State v. Holden,
No. 1002012520, 2010 WL 5140744, at *8 (Del. Super. Ct. Dec. 14, 2010).
95. Four states courts have found warrantless GPS tracking impermissible:
Commonwealth v. Connolly, 913 N.E.2d 356, 370 (Mass. 2009); People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d
1195, 1203 (N.Y. 2009); State v. Campbell, 759 P.2d 1040, 1049 (Or. 1988); State v. Jackson, 76
P.3d 217, 224 (Wash. 2003). Five found it permissible: Stone v. State, 941 A.2d 1238, 1250–51
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2008); Osburn v. State, 44 P.3d 523, 526 (Nev. 2002); State v. Johnson,
944 N.E.2d 270, 279 (Ohio Ct. App. 2010), appeal docketed, 943 N.E.2d 572 (Ohio 2011);
Foltz v. Commonwealth, 698 S.E.2d 281, 292–93 (Va. Ct. App. 2010); State v. Sveum, 769
N.W.2d 53 (Wis. Ct. App. 2009). The issue of GPS tracking as a search is currently before the
Ohio Supreme Court, which must grapple with the split among the Ohio appellate courts.
Compare State v. Johnson, 944 N.E.2d at 279 (“[P]lacing a GPS device on a vehicle to track
the vehicles whereabouts does not constitute a search or seizure according to the Fourth
Amendment and Ohio’s Constitution”), with State v. Jefferson, 8th Dist. No. 95950, 2011Ohio-4637 at ¶ 21 (Ohio App. Ct. Sep. 15, 2011) (holding that if defendant’s counsel had filed
a motion to suppress GPS evidence, “there is a strong likelihood such motion would have
been granted,” based on Maynard), and State v. White, 5th Dist. No. 2010-CA-60, 2011-Ohio4526 at ¶ 29 (Ohio App. Ct. Sep. 1, 2011) (“We respectfully disagree with our brethren in the
Twelfth Appellate District. We find . . . a warrant was required before placing the GPS
tracking unit on the suspect vehicle and to continuously monitor the tracking signal.”).
96. See People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195, 1202 (N.Y. 2009) (noting “the unsettled state
of federal law” on the issue of GPS monitoring).
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97

law. This Note will focus on the three state court decisions that are
98
most germane and potentially influential to the larger federal question.
In State v. Jackson, the most prominent of the state cases and,
arguably, the genesis of the argument against GPS tracking, the state
court held that tracking via GPS is a search and seizure under the
99
Washington Constitution and thus requires a warrant. The defendant
in the case was convicted of first-degree murder after authorities used
GPS tracking to locate the remote site where he had dumped his
100
daughter’s body. Pursuant to a warrant, the GPS tracking devices had
been attached to the defendant’s two automobiles (without his
knowledge) while the automobiles were lawfully impounded; the GPS
101
devices were used to track the defendant’s location for ten days. The
court decided the case based only on an interpretation of Washington
state law, and made almost no mention of Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence; however, the court’s interpretation was generally in line
102
with Fourth Amendment case law.
The court stated that something observed from a “lawful vantage
103
point” merely through use of the senses is not a search. But, the court
went on to say that “‘a substantial and unreasonable departure from a
lawful vantage point, or a particularly intrusive method of viewing, may
104
constitute a search.’” This precedent is consistent with the Kyllo quasi105
With respect to GPS
formulaic approach to extrasensory devices.
tracking, the court questioned the state appellate court’s determination
97. See Jallad, supra note 69, at 364–65 (explaining that state court decisions have
“analyses [that] travel outside of the Fourth Amendment, [and thus] their authoritative
guidance is limited since state courts are free to afford broader protections under their own
constitutions”).
98. For a discussion of other state cases addressing GPS monitoring, see Adam Koppel,
Note, Warranting a Warrant: Fourth Amendment Concerns Raised by Law Enforcement’s
Warrantless Use of GPS and Cellular Phone Tracking, 64 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1061 (2010).
99. Jackson, 76 P.3d at 224.
100. Id. at 221.
101. Id. at 220–21.
102. See Koppel, supra note 98, at 1074 (“Though the Jackson court did not rely upon
the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment case law, its focus on the potential intrusiveness of
the technology was entirely consistent with the directive of the Katz line of cases.”).
103. Jackson, 76 P.3d at 222; see also Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375 (1993).
104. Jackson, 76 P.3d at 222 (quoting State v. Young, 867 P.2d 593, 598 (Wash. 1994))
(emphasis added).
105. See Hutchins, supra note 35, at 437 (describing the quasi-formulaic approach in
Kyllo).
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that GPS devices were merely sense augmenting; the court noted,
instead, that use of GPS does not equate to following someone on public
roads, but rather “provides a technological substitute for traditional
106
visual tracking.” Thus, the court determined that GPS was essentially
extrasensory because the surveillance it afforded could not have been
107
accomplished without interruption by law enforcement.
The court also focused on the potential intrusiveness that GPS
108
tracking would inevitably lead to.
Similar to the later interpretation
by Maynard, the court noted that GPS could provide a detailed record
109
of a person’s life, just based on where he or she went.
The court
further stated that “[i]n this age, vehicles are used to take people to a
vast number of places that can reveal preferences, alignments,
associations, personal ails and foibles,” all of which can paint a highly
110
detailed portrait of an individual.
Additionally, the court noted the
common fear that this technology would be used to track individuals
111
regardless of suspected criminal activity.
Thus, the court held that
people “have a right to be free from the type of governmental intrusion
that occurs when a GPS device is attached to a citizen’s vehicle,
regardless of reduced privacy expectations due to advances in
112
technology.”
The New York Court of Appeals in People v. Weaver found, similar
to Jackson, that use of GPS tracking was a violation of an individual’s
113
reasonable expectation of privacy. In Weaver, the tracking was done
106. Jackson, 76 P.3d at 223.
107. Id.; see also Hutchins, supra note 35, at 449 (noting that the Jackson court
“[i]mplicitly referenc[ed] the two categories of technology identified to date by the Supreme
Court—extrasensory and sense augmenting—. . . [and] concluded that GPS surveillance
should most fairly be treated as the former, and not the latter”); Otterberg, supra note 81, at
681 (stating that the Jackson court found that GPS serves as “a total substitute for visual
tracking and therefore was distinguishable from other sense-augmenting devices like
binoculars” (citing Jackson, 76 P.3d at 223–24)).
108. Jackson, 76 P.3d at 223 (“[T]he intrusion into private affairs made possible with a
GPS device is quite extensive . . . .”).
109. Id.; United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 562 (D.C. Cir. 2010), reh’g denied en
banc sub nom. United States v. Jones, 625 F.3d 766 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct.
671 (2010), cert. granted sub nom. United States v. Jones, 131 S. Ct. 3064 (2011), and aff’d on
other grounds, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
110. Jackson, 76 P.3d at 223.
111. Id. at 224.
112. Id.
113. People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195, 1203 (N.Y. 2009).
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for sixty-five days, a far more substantial time than the twenty-plus days
114
in Jackson. Unlike the Jackson court, however, the Weaver court did
rely on federal Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, in addition to state
115
law protections. The court outlined the precedent in Katz and, more
specifically, Knotts, but was quick to explain that Knotts was not
completely analogous to the case before it because one could not deny
“more than a quarter of a century later,” that a beeper is “a very
116
primitive tracking device” compared to GPS.
The court also noted
that Knotts involved the single trip of a container of chloroform, as
opposed to the GPS monitoring in the case at hand, which monitored all
117
trips within a 65-day period.
Moreover, the court related that the
“dragnet-style” monitoring that the Knotts court had reserved judgment
on had finally arrived, and that “GPS technology, even in its present
118
state of evolution, quite simply and matter-of-factly forces the issue.”
Additionally, the court addressed the Kyllo extrasensory versus sense119
augmenting dichotomy, stating that “GPS is not a mere enhancement
of human sensory capacity, it facilitates a new technological perception
of the world in which the situation of any object may be followed and
exhaustively recorded over, in most cases, a practically unlimited
120
period.”
Addressing the reasonable expectation of privacy that people have
in their day-to-day movements in their automobiles, the court was
unwilling to cede that there had been “any dramatic diminution in the
socially reasonable expectation that our communications and
121
transactions will remain to a large extent private.”
The court
acknowledged that there were in fact diminished expectations, but not
to the point that “we effectively consent to the unsupervised disclosure
to law enforcement authorities of all that GPS technology can and will
122
reveal.”
Thus, the court was unwilling to find that a person’s
114.
115.
(1928)).
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Id. at 1195; Jackson, 76 P.3d at 220–21.
Weaver, 909 N.E.2d at 1197 (citing Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478–79
Id. at 1198–99.
Id. at 1199.
Id. at 1200.
See supra notes 35–37 and accompanying text.
Weaver, 909 N.E.2d at 1199.
Id. at 1200.
Id.
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reasonable expectation of privacy has been so diminished by technology
that surreptitious use of GPS tracking devices raised no constitutional
123
issue at all. Similar to the Jackson court, the court in Weaver stressed
that the amount of information that GPS could provide about an
individual (especially over the course of sixty-five days) would be of
“breathtaking quality and quantity” and, inferentially, would be a large
124
invasion of privacy. In conclusion, the court held that use of GPS to
125
track an individual was a search under the Fourth Amendment. The
court did offer one caveat, noting that technological advances can serve
to help law enforcement, but it indicated that “[w]ithout judicial
oversight, the use of these powerful devices presents a significant and, to
126
our minds, unacceptable risk of abuse.”
Not all state courts, however, have found GPS tracking
127
impermissible. In Foltz v. Commonwealth, for example, the court held
that GPS tracking of a sexual offender in his company van for ten days
128
was not a violation of the Fourth Amendment.
As in Weaver, the
court addressed the Kyllo dichotomy, articulating that use of GPS was
merely sense-augmenting, and enabled the police to “technologically
supplement . . . information which the police could have obtained by
129
their own sensory perception.” Thus, the court saw the facts as merely
a Knotts analogue, albeit using more advanced technology, and
therefore asserted that GPS monitoring fell within the existing Fourth
130
Amendment framework. The court also noted in a footnote that the
case could be distinguished from Maynard because Maynard involved
more than a month of monitoring, whereas in Foltz it was merely ten

123. Id.
124. Id. at 1199–200.
125. Id. at 1202.
126. Id. at 1203.
127. Foltz v. Commonwealth, 698 S.E.2d 281 (Va. Ct. App. 2010); see also Osburn v.
State, 44 P.3d 523, 526 (Nev. 2002) (“[T]he attachment of the electronic tracking device to the
bumper of [the defendant’s] vehicle did not constitute an unreasonable search or seizure
under the Nevada Constitution.”); State v. Sveum, 769 N.W.2d 53, 60 (Wis. Ct. App. 2009)
(“[N]o Fourth Amendment search or seizure occurs when police attach a GPS device to the
outside of a vehicle while it is in a place accessible to the public and then use that device to
track the vehicle while it is in public view.”).
128. Foltz, 698 S.E.2d at 292.
129. Id. at 291.
130. Id. (“We find that this advancement in tracking technology provides an insufficient
basis for distinguishing Knotts.”).
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131

days.
The court more convincingly distinguished this case from
Maynard by explaining that the cases differed fundamentally in the
amount and type of monitoring done: In Maynard, authorities
monitored the defendant’s personal vehicle over the course of a month,
which would show all of the places he had been; in Foltz, the defendant
was only being monitored while on the job, since the GPS device was
132
affixed to his work van. This more limited use of monitoring (in terms
of time and of scope) appears to have convinced the court that the
133
defendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy had not been violated.
This distinction from Maynard is arguably significant because one’s
actions at work are fundamentally more “public” (depending on the
job); consequently, if one is subject to employer supervision, invasion by
law enforcement could be construed as less offensive.
It remains clear that without federal guidance, state court decisions
will continue to be disparate and unsettled; without a constitutional
floor, an individual’s movements in an automobile will be protected only
to the extent that states are willing to find that people have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in those movements by using Fourth Amendment
analogues within state constitutions.
B. The First Federal Appellate Interpretations—Garcia and Marquez
The first elaborate analysis of GPS tracking relating to Fourth
Amendment searches occurred in United States v. Garcia, an opinion
134
authored by Judge Posner of the Seventh Circuit.
In Garcia, the
defendant challenged the use of a GPS tracker that was placed on his
automobile without a warrant and eventually revealed his travels to a
135
large tract of land used to manufacture methamphetamines.
Judge
Posner began by stating that using GPS was functionally equivalent to
using cameras or satellite imaging, and that if those methods of

131. Id. at 291 n.12. For a discussion of the Maynard court’s holding and rationale, see
infra Part IV.
132. Foltz, 698 S.E.2d at 291 n.12; see also infra Part IV.
133. Foltz, 698 S.E.2d at 291 n.12; see also infra Part IV.
134. United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994 (7th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 883
(2007). However, Garcia was not the first federal court of appeals case to address GPS
monitoring. See United States v. McIver, 186 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 1999).
135. Garcia, 474 F.3d at 995; see also Ryan J. Foley, Police Use GPS to Track Suspects
Despite Murky Law, ASSOCIATED PRESS, May 25, 2009, available at
http://www.pantagraph.com/news/article_74ee4137-bf8c-56ea-925f-89e26eb4e4a8.html.
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surveillance are not a search under the Fourth Amendment, neither is
136
the use of GPS. But, he conceded that this could not be the end of the
argument because “the meaning of a Fourth Amendment search must
137
change to keep pace with the march of science.” Judge Posner then
postulated that GPS tracking devices could be used in a more
widespread “wholesale surveillance” application by the government,
and that it would be “premature to rule that such a program of mass
surveillance could not possibly raise a question under the Fourth
138
Amendment.”
He noted the need for the police to continue to be
efficient in the twenty-first century by using more advanced devices and
that doing so involves the traditional “tradeoff between security and
139
privacy.”
In conclusion, he stated, pragmatically, Chief Justice
Warren’s warning in Lopez v. United States that “‘the fantastic advances
in the field of electronic communication constitute a great danger to the
privacy of the individual’” and that the court has a responsibility to
140
supervise the “‘indiscriminate use of such devices.’”
The court
ultimately held that use of GPS tracking was no more offensive to
Fourth Amendment rights than the use of cameras or satellite
141
imagery.
Notably, Judge Posner’s continual forward thinking
136. Garcia, 474 F.3d at 997.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 998.
139. Id.
140. Id. (quoting Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 441 (1963)).
141. Id. at 997. This holding was upheld in United States v. Cuevas-Perez, 640 F.3d 272
(7th Cir. 2011). However, reminiscent of Judge Kozinski’s dissent in Pineda-Moreno, Justice
Diane Wood also wrote a forceful dissent, stating, inter alia, that
To conclude that open-ended, real-time GPS surveillance is not a ‘search’
invites an unprecedented level of government intrusion into every person’s private
life. The government could, without any metric of suspicion, monitor the
whereabouts of any person without constitutional constraint. Under the majority’s
view, such surveillance is tolerable. And because the Fourth Amendment protects
individual rights, it is not clear why the use of GPS technology for mass surveillance
would trigger the warrant requirement if the suspicionless surveillance of an
individual does not. Thus, not only is the indefinite GPS surveillance of a single
person permissible; the government could also keep tabs on entire communities,
perhaps with the hope of identifying hints of criminal conduct. Under the majority’s
framework, GPS tracking of all cars in a high-crime area is as unremarkable as an
officer on the beat posing a polite question to a local resident. All of this can occur
solely at the whim of a governmental actor, and there would be no requirement to
demonstrate any suspicion of wrongdoing to a neutral magistrate.
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provided a warning that “[s]hould government someday decide to
institute programs of mass surveillance of vehicular movements, it will
be time enough to decide whether the Fourth Amendment should be
142
interpreted to treat such surveillance as a search.”
While Judge
Posner’s belief that that time has not arrived is debatable, his decision is
unequivocally qualified by “draw[ing] a line between technological
143
‘capability’ and ‘reality.’”
At least one commentator has attempted to distinguish Garcia from
other state and federal cases because law enforcement in Garcia used a
memory-tracking unit that did not provide real-time information about
144
the defendant’s whereabouts but had to be downloaded at a later time.
While it is unclear whether this distinction in what type of GPS
technology was used colored Judge Posner’s opinion, it is irrelevant if it
145
did so because the intrusiveness of GPS tracking is not related, per se,
to when the information is reviewed, but instead is related to the
146
amount and type of information that the GPS tracking reveals.
The Eighth Circuit addressed a similar case in United States v.
Marquez, holding that the defendant lacked standing to challenge GPS
tracking on an automobile he was in, but that even if he had standing,
Cuevas-Perez, 640 F.3d at 294 (Wood, J., dissenting) (internal citation omitted).
142. Garcia, 474 F.3d at 998.
143. See Jallad, supra note 69, at 372–73.
144. See Koppel, supra note 98, at 1078–79. The Seventh Circuit recently rejected this
argument in United States v. Cuevas-Perez, holding that the court was not persuaded “that
real-time revelation of location (although additional to the information provided in Garcia)
necessarily serves the impermissible ends of the extensive GPS surveillance at issue in
Maynard.” 640 F.3d 272, 275 (7th Cir. 2011). At least one state court has also found this
distinction unpersuasive. See State v. Brereton, 2011 WI App 127, ¶ 15, 337 Wis. 2d 145, 804
N.W.2d 243 (“[W]e see no reason to find that the police overstepped their bounds simply
because they were able to monitor the movements in real time rather than needing to
continually return to the car, remove the device, and download its information to a
computer.”).
145. To make Fourth Amendment jurisprudence turn on this distinction would be a
move in the wrong direction. Judge Bell in United States v. Walker forecloses this GPS
technology distinction in a notable way: “That the officers here chose to use a specifically
engineered GPS tracking device rather than merely duct-taping an iPhone to Defendant’s
bumper is of little moment. The technology in this case is in general use . . . .” 771 F. Supp.
2d 803, 811 (W.D. Mich. 2011).
146. See Hutchins, supra note 35, at 457 (“[A]pplication of the general rules governing
qualitative categories of technology are moderated by consideration of the quantity or
specificity of information revealed. In other words, as with other forms of enhanced
surveillance, after GPS-enabled technology is qualitatively classified, the question of
constitutional protection turns on the quantity of information revealed by the surveillance.”).
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147

the GPS tracking was nevertheless permissible. In Marquez, the facts
insinuate that a GPS tracker was used over the course of many months
to track the defendant’s whereabouts to gather evidence about a drug
148
ring.
The defendant was a passenger in the automobile that was
149
tracked, but he neither owned nor drove the automobile. The court
addressed the GPS tracking in dicta; it noted the precedent provided by
Knotts and elucidated that “when police have reasonable suspicion . . .
[that a particular vehicle is or will be used in the commission of a crime]
. . . a warrant is not required when, while the vehicle is parked in a
public place, they install a non-invasive GPS tracking device on it for a
150
reasonable period of time.” The court did not provide, however, any
151
reasoning as to what constitutes a reasonable amount of time.
Like the court in Garcia, the court in Marquez indicated that the
“‘wholesale surveillance’” scenario from Garcia would similarly change
the way the court interpreted a case with facts of that nature and the
court might not find such surveillance permissible; however, the court
concluded that the surveillance before it was not of that type, and thus
152
such postulating had no bearing on the holding. The court did suggest
that GPS tracking was merely sense-augmenting, stating that “[t]he
device merely allowed the police to reduce the cost of lawful
153
surveillance.” In some respects, Marquez widened the scope of Garcia
because, in Marquez, the surveillance occurred over a long period of
time, and the court was willing to adopt the Knotts holding that anything
that occurs in public in an automobile is without a subjective
154
expectation of privacy. However, because the court in Marquez found
the defendant had no standing, and the relevant portions are in dicta, it
155
is only minimally informative.
C. GPS Tracking in the Forefront—The Ninth Circuit’s Interpretation in
147. United States v. Marquez, 605 F.3d 604, 609 (8th Cir. 2010).
148. Id. at 607. It is unclear exactly how long the GPS tracker was in place based on the
decision; however, it was placed in May and removed in October, id., so the assumption is
more than a few months.
149. Id. at 609.
150. Id. at 610.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 609–10.
155. Id. at 609.
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Pineda-Moreno
The most publicized case involving GPS tracking is United States v.
156
Pineda-Moreno. In Pineda-Moreno, the defendant moved to suppress
evidence obtained from GPS tracking, arguing that the evidence
157
obtained violated his Fourth Amendment rights. The defendant was
suspected of being part of a drug ring and was monitored with “various
types of mobile tracking devices” over the course of a four-month
158
period.
The defendant asserted, inter alia, that use of the tracking
devices to continuously monitor him subverted Kyllo’s holding that
usage of sense-enhancing devices is a search unless the device is in
159
public use. There is no indication that the defendant asserted a more
general reasonable expectation of privacy claim against the four-month
160
tracking of his movements. Instead, the defendant’s main contention
was that Knotts should therefore not control because the Supreme Court
had “heavily modified the Fourth Amendment analysis applicable to
161
such technological devices in Kyllo.”
However, the court found this
contention misguided, relating that a “search” does not occur every time
officers use “sense-enhancing technology not available to the general
162
public.” Moreover, the court stated that the use of GPS in this case
was equivalent to following an automobile on a public street, something
that is “unequivocally not a search within the meaning of the [Fourth
163
A]mendment.”
After dismissing the defendant’s claim under Kyllo,
the court then neatly fit the situation within Knotts, stating that
156. United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212 (9th Cir. 2010), reh’g en banc
denied, 617 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2010), petition for cert. filed, No. 10-7515 (U.S. Nov. 10, 2010).
157. Id. at 1214.
158. Id. at 1213.
159. Id. at 1216. His contention, as noted by the court, misstates Kyllo’s precedent. Id.
Pineda-Moreno also asserted that his reasonable expectation of privacy was violated by
installation of the device in public areas and in his curtilage (in this case, his driveway). Id. at
1214–15. The court’s holding that an officer may enter the curtilage to install such a device
caused a large amount of contention nationally, as well. Id. at 1215; see also Matt Buchanan,
Our Worst Nightmares About the Government Tracking Us Just Came True, GIZMODO (Aug.
26, 2010), http://gizmodo.com/5622800/our-worst-nightmares-about-the-government-trackingus-just-came-true (discussing the court of appeals’ decision upholding the lower court; the
appellate decision was more highly publicized).
160. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d at 1212.
161. Id. at 1216.
162. Id. The court refers to GPS as sense-enhancing; however, it is arguably extrasensory.
163. Id. (quoting United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 997 (7th Cir. 2007).
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“‘[i]nsofar as [Pineda-Moreno’s] complaint appears to be simply that
scientific devices such as [tracking devices] enabled the police to be
more effective in detecting crime, it simply has no constitutional
foundation.
We have never equated police efficiency with
164
unconstitutionality, and we decline to do so now.’”
Thus, the Pineda-Moreno court was able to dismiss any argument of
an invasion of privacy by leveraging Knotts’ assertion of no privacy in
public automotive movements, and impliedly using Kyllo’s quasiformulaic distinction between sense-augmenting and extrasensory
165
devices. The court’s explanation, in essence, stated that “[t]echnology
did not . . . alter what was already in the public domain,” a holding not
166
unlike the holding in Knotts.
After the decision was handed down, the defendant appealed for a
167
rehearing en banc, which was denied. Chief Judge Kozinski (joined by
others) wrote a stirring dissent to this denial, which touched on many of
168
the issues that the original decision ignored. Judge Kozinski discussed,
inter alia, the overlooked issue regarding the constant monitoring of a
169
person’s movements over an elongated course of time. Judge Kozinski
ascribed to the notion also mentioned in Weaver that “[t]he electronic
tracking devices used by the police in this case have little in common
170
with the primitive devices in Knotts.” Like the court in Weaver, Judge
Kozinski also asserted that Knotts could be distinguished from the
present case because tracking one container of chloroform with a beeper
is not equivalent to using “GPS satellites to pinpoint the car’s location
on a continuing basis,” without the need for an officer’s intervention

164. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d at 1216 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v.
Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 284 (1983)). Other courts have discounted or found irrelevant the
difference in technology between a beeper and GPS. See, e.g., United States v. Narrl, 789 F.
Supp. 2d 645, 652 (D.S.C. 2011) (“Knotts was not limited to any particular technology . . . .”).
165. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983); see supra text accompanying note
36.
166. See Jallad, supra note 69, at 370.
167. United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 617 F.3d 1120, 1121 (9th Cir. 2010), petition for
cert. filed, No. 10-7515 (U.S. Nov. 10, 2010).
168. Id. at 1121–26 (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting).
169. Id. at 1123–24.
170. Id. at 1124; see also People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195, 1199 (N.Y. 2009) (“Knotts
involved the use of what we must now, more than a quarter of a century later, recognize to
have been a very primitive tracking device.”).
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(except to download or monitor the information).
Judge Kozinski
further argued that GPS tracking, along with other new technologies, is
not sense-augmenting, but extrasensory because of the sophisticated
172
information that it can provide.
Insinuating an Orwellian society,
Judge Kozinski asserted that “[b]y holding that this kind of surveillance
doesn’t impair an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy, the
panel hands the government the power to track the movements of every
173
one of us, every day of our lives.”
While that statement is arguably
melodramatic, it in essence states what Weaver and Jackson attempted
174
to imply.
Finally, after reviewing other technologies that are “advance ripples
to a tidal wave of technological assaults on our privacy,” Judge Kozinski
returned to the inferential leap one must make from Knotts to Pineda175
Moreno; namely, that what Knotts held—that one has no reasonable
expectation of privacy in her public travels, because visual surveillance
(or enhanced versions of it) could see you—is a far cry from the inability
to “hid[e] from the all-seeing network of GPS satellites that hover
overhead, which never sleep, never blink, never get confused and never
176
lose attention.” He also forwarded the less convincing argument that
a guilty person would not know to disguise his or her movements
because “they’ll have no reason to suspect that Big Brother is watching
177
them.”
In closing, Judge Kozinski asserted that society has reached
the time that Knotts foretold—where dragnet-style surveillance is
possible—and that “[t]his is precisely the wrong time for a court
covering one-fifth of the country’s population to say that the Fourth
Amendment has no role to play in mediating the voracious appetites of

171. Pineda-Moreno, 617 F.3d at 1124; Weaver, 909 N.E.2d at 1199.
172. Pineda-Moreno, 617 F.3d at 1124 (“The modern devices used in [the defendant’s]
case can record the car’s movements without human intervention.”).
173. Id.
174. Both Weaver and Jackson lamented the large amount of potentially intimate
information that could be obtained about an individual, for an extended duration—there is
not a large inferential step from there to constant government monitoring. Weaver, 909
N.E.2d at 1199; State v. Jackson, 76 P.3d 217, 223 (Wash. 2003); see also Hutchins, supra note
35, at 459 (noting that if GPS tracking isn’t a search, “the government will be entitled to check
whether we spend our lunch hour at the gym, at the temple, or at the strip club”).
175. Pineda-Moreno, 617 F.3d at 1125.
176. Id. at 1125–26.
177. Id. at 1126.
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178

law enforcement.”
In the wake of Judge Kozinski’s stirring dissent
was a growing awareness of the implications of GPS tracking within the
179
public.
If the reasonable expectation of privacy is a function of
societal expectations, then arguments here and in Maynard will certainly
180
affect the public opinion when the Supreme Court decides this issue.
IV. A FUNDAMENTALLY DIFFERENT FEDERAL INTERPRETATION—
UNITED STATES V. MAYNARD
Handed down six days prior to the Ninth Circuit’s denial of
rehearing en banc in Pineda-Moreno, the Maynard decision furthered a
novel approach to Fourth Amendment jurisprudence by injecting
“mosaic theory,” a theory typically reserved for Freedom of Information
Act (FOIA) and national security cases, to counter what some argue is
181
constantly eroding privacy due to technological innovation.
The
opinion by Judge Ginsburg flew in the face of Pineda-Moreno, and
182
reignited the ongoing privacy debate with regard to GPS.
In Maynard, the defendant Jones’s Jeep was outfitted with a GPS
device that was installed without a warrant and his movements were

178. Id.
179. See Cohen, supra note 12; Editorial, Supreme Court, Congress Need New Rules for
GPS Searches, BOS. GLOBE, Sept. 2, 2010, http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/editorial_
opinion/editorials/articles/2010/09/02/supreme_court_congress_need_new_rules_for_gps_sear
ches; Whitehead, supra note 12.
180. See generally United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 562 (D.C. Cir. 2010), reh’g
denied en banc sub nom. United States v. Jones, 625 F.3d 766 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. denied,
131 S. Ct. 671 (2010), cert. granted sub nom. United States v. Jones, 131 S. Ct. 3064 (2011),
and aff’d on other grounds, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012); Shaun B. Spencer, Reasonable Expectations
and the Erosion of Privacy, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 843 (2002).
181. Maynard, 615 F.3d at 562. See generally Recent Case, United States v. Maynard,
615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir.), reh’g en banc denied, No. 08-0304, 2010 WL 4703743 (D.C. Cir. Nov.
19, 2010), cert. denied, No. 10-7102, 2010 WL 4156203 (U.S. Nov. 29, 2010), 124 HARV. L.
REV. 827 (2011); Editorial, An Illegal Search, by GPS, NY TIMES, Oct. 5, 2010, at A30; Orin
Kerr, D.C. Circuit Introduces “Mosaic Theory” of Fourth Amendment, Holds GPS
Monitoring a Fourth Amendment Search, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Aug. 6, 2010),
http://volokh.com/2010/08/06/d-c-circuit-introduces-mosaic-theory-of-fourth-amendment-hold
s-gps-monitoring-a-fourth-amendment-search/ [hereinafter Kerr, D.C. Circuit] (noting that
Maynard is unpersuasive because “it ignores and misrepresents a wide range of Fourth
Amendment cases and principles”); Julian Sanchez, GPS Tracking and a Mosaic Theory of
Government Searches, CATO @ LIBERTY (Aug. 11, 2010), http://www.cato-at-liberty.org/gpstracking-and-a-mosaic-theory-of-government-searches/.
182. See Kerr, D.C. Circuit, supra note 181.
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183

tracked twenty-four hours a day for four weeks.
Jones argued that
evidence gained from the GPS tracking was improperly admitted
because the tracking constituted an unreasonable search under the
184
Fourth Amendment. The government, consistent with its position in
previous cases, contended that this case fell squarely within the Knotts
holding, and thus the defendant’s Fourth Amendment argument could
be dismissed because Jones’s movements were on public thoroughfares
185
where no reasonable expectation of privacy exists. The court rejected
the government’s contention, pointing to the Supreme Court’s decision
to reserve judgment on the “dragnet” question in Knotts, and relaying
that in Knotts, the Court did not hold that a person “has no reasonable
expectation of privacy in his movements whatsoever, world without end,
186
The court then used this
as the Government would have it.”
distinction—that some reasonable expectation of privacy is carved out
even when traveling in public in an automobile—to distinguish this case
187
from Garcia and Pineda-Moreno.
The distinguishing element here,
the court explained, was that Jones actually argued that prolonged
monitoring was a search falling outside of Knotts; this granular
distinction is fundamentally important because the defendants in Garcia
and Pineda-Moreno conceded that Knotts was controlling, essentially
foreclosing the “dragnet” argument, allowing the Garcia and PinedaMoreno courts to continue to leave for another day “whether
188
‘wholesale’ or ‘mass’ electronic surveillance . . . requires a warrant.”
Moreover, the court reinforced that Knotts did not apply to the facts
before it, because law enforcement tracked Jones’s “movements 24
hours a day for 28 days as he moved among scores of places, thereby
discovering the totality and pattern of his movements from place to
183. Maynard, 615 F.3d at 555.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 556; see also United States v. Marquez, 605 F.3d 604 (8th Cir. 2010); United
States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994 (7th Cir. 2007). Subsequent to Maynard, many courts have
found that GPS monitoring still falls under Knotts. See, e.g., United States v. Sparks, 750 F.
Supp. 2d 384, 392 (D. Mass. 2010) (holding that use of GPS to catch bank robbers within the
same day fell within Knotts and the Maynard “synergism” was unconvincing). However,
Sparks is likely distinguishable from Maynard in that the monitoring in Sparks occurred over
one single day, whereas the defendant in Maynard was tracked for a month. Id.; Maynard,
615 F.3d at 555.
186. Maynard, 615 F.3d at 557.
187. Id. at 557–58.
188. Id.
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189

place to place.”
However, resolution of whether Knotts applied was not the end of
the case—the defendant still needed to prove that he had a reasonable
expectation of privacy, and that “depends in large part upon whether
that expectation relates to information that has been ‘expose[d] to the
190
public.’”
This inquiry focuses on both actual exposure and
191
constructive exposure.
Addressing actual exposure, the court stated that when considering
whether something is actually exposed to the public, one must ask “not
what another person can physically and may lawfully do but rather what
192
a reasonable person expects another might actually do.”
The court
then rejected the argument that all of Jones’s travels were actually
exposed to the public because it would be highly unlikely that a stranger
193
would observe all of another’s movements over the course of a month.
The court explained that
[i]t is one thing for a passerby to observe or even to follow
someone during a single journey as he goes to the market or
returns home from work. It is another thing entirely for that
stranger to pick up the scent again the next day and the day after
that, week in and week out, dogging his prey until he has
189. Id. at 558. However, post-Maynard, at least one court has found that tracking for
an even longer time than twenty-eight days still does not constitute dragnet-type surveillance,
and that Knotts still applies. See United States v. Walker, 771 F. Supp. 2d 803, 811, 817 n.2
(W.D. Mich. 2011).
190. Maynard, 615 F.3d at 558 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)).
191. Id. at 558.
192. Id. at 559 (emphasis added).
193. Id. at 560 (“[W]e hold the whole of a person’s movements over the course of a
month is not actually exposed to the public because the likelihood a stranger would observe
all of those movements is not just remote, it is essentially nil.”). The Maynard court’s
probabilistic approach to the Fourth Amendment, here, derives from one of the many ways
that the Supreme Court has approached Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. See Kerr, Four
Models, supra note 57, at 508–12 (“Under the probabilistic approach, a person has a
reasonable expectation of privacy when the odds are very high that others will not
successfully pry into his affairs.”). This probabilistic argument is taken even further in Jones’s
brief to the Supreme Court, even reinvoking property rights along with it. See Brief for
Respondent at 11, 28–29, supra note 89. The respondents argued that Jones did have a
reasonable expectation of privacy because, while GPS tracking devices are available to the
public, it would be unlawful for another person to attach it to Jones’s car, and thus Jones
would not reasonably expect it to happen—i.e., not probable. Id. at 20. The Jones Court
adopted this property rights approach. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
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identified all the places, people, amusements, and chores that
194
make up that person’s hitherto private routine.
Moving on to constructive exposure, the court addressed the veiled
and more technical issue of whether all of Jones’s movements were
“constructively exposed because each of his individual movements
195
during that time was itself in public view.” Therefore, even though no
one might have actually seen all that he did, the mere fact that
everything was public would have been sufficient to defeat his
reasonable expectation of privacy. The government did not raise this
issue, but the court explained that it was important to address it. To do
so, the court borrowed from national security and FOIA cases and
analyzed the use from a data aggregation standpoint or “mosaic
196
theory.” One commentator has described mosaic theory as the notion
that
[d]isparate items of information, though individually of limited
or no utility to their possessor, can take on added significance
when combined with other items of information. Combining the
items illuminates their interrelationships and breeds analytic
synergies, so that the resulting mosaic of information is worth
197
more than the sum of its parts.
Mosaic theory or “compilation” has also been defined more
succinctly in national security applications as “‘the concept that
apparently harmless pieces of information when assembled together
198
could reveal a damaging picture.’” Applying this concept to a Fourth
199
Amendment reasonable expectation of privacy case was wholly novel.
194. Maynard, 615 F.3d at 560.
195. Id. at 560–61.
196. Id. at 561–62.
197. David E. Pozen, Note, The Mosaic Theory, National Security, and the Freedom of
Information Act, 115 YALE L.J. 628, 630 (2005).
198. Id. (quoting 32 C.F.R. § 701.31 (2005)). For a larger discussion of mosaic theory as
it relates to FOIA and national security, see Pozen, supra note 197.
199. See Kerr, D.C. Circuit, supra note 181 (“Maynard introduces a novel theory of the
Fourth Amendment: That whether government conduct is a search is measured not by
whether a particular individual act is a search, but rather whether an entire course of conduct,
viewed collectively, amounts to a search.”). This approach has not been without its criticisms.
See generally id.; United States v. Jones, 625 F.3d 766, 767 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Sentelle, C.J.,
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In its analysis, the Maynard court first looked to United States
Department of Justice v. National Reporters Committee, a FOIA case in
which a CBS correspondent and others had requested the FBI rap sheet
of a member of the Medico crime family; the reporter had requested
200
under FOIA those parts of the rap sheet that were of public record.
Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, said that although the
information in the rap sheet had previously been disclosed to the public,
a person’s privacy interest in that information did not “approach zero,”
and thus, the Supreme Court rejected the “respondents’ cramped notion
201
of personal privacy.” The Supreme Court went further and noted the
distinction between “scattered disclosure of the bits of information
202
contained in a rap sheet and revelation of the rap sheet as a whole.”
The Supreme Court went on to hold that disclosure would implicate
Fourth Amendment concerns and “could reasonably be expected to
203
constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.”
Building upon the distinction between the whole and the sum of its
parts, the Maynard court then drew precedent from Smith v. Maryland,
204
a Fourth Amendment case having to do with pen registers.
The
Maynard court found it telling that if
the privacy interest in a whole could be no greater (or no
different) than the privacy interest in its constituent parts, then
the Supreme Court would have had no reason to consider at
length whether . . . a reasonable expectation of privacy [exists] in
205
the list of numbers [one calls].

dissenting) (stating that the panel’s decision was “inconsistent not only with every other
federal circuit which has considered the case, but more importantly, with controlling Supreme
Court precedent set forth in United States v. Knotts” (internal citation omitted)), denying cert.
to United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 562 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. denied sub nom. United
States v. Maynard, 131 S. Ct. 671 (2010), and cert. granted, United States v. Jones, 131 S. Ct.
3064 (2011), aff’d on other grounds, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
200. United States Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489
U.S. 749, 757 (1989).
201. Id. at 762–63.
202. Id. at 764.
203. Id. at 770–71.
204. Maynard, 615 F.3d at 561; Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979). A pen register is
a device used to record the numbers a person dials from their phone. Smith, 442 U.S. at 737.
205. Maynard, 615 F.3d at 561.

13-WEBB.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

786

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

3/20/2012 2:08 PM

[95:751

The court more specifically pointed to Justice Stewart’s dissent in
Smith, where he stated that a reasonable expectation of privacy should
exist in the list of calls one makes because “such a list . . . could reveal
the identities of the persons and places called, and thus reveal the most
206
intimate details of a person’s life.” Explicit within this reference to the
intimate details of one’s life is Jones’s argument to the court that GPS
data essentially reveals the same thing when aggregated. Justice
Marshall, dissenting in Smith as well, went further in his criticism of the
call list, referring to it as an “‘extensive [intrusion],’” that can
“‘significantly jeopardize [individuals’] sense of security’” and stating
that such methods thus require “‘more than self-restraint by law
207
enforcement officials.’” While not mentioned by the Maynard court,
Justice Marshall’s call for restraint when dealing with extensive privacy
intrusions resonates similarly today with GPS use.
Upon this foundation that the Fourth Amendment implicates a
distinction between the whole and the sum of its parts, the court
described the whole of Jones’s movements over the course of a month as
not constructively exposed because, “like a rap sheet, that whole reveals
208
far more than the individual movements it comprises.” And appealing
to a true “mosaic theory” case from a national security perspective, the
court stated that “‘[w]hat may seem trivial to the uninformed, may
209
appear of great moment to one who has a broad view of the scene.’”
This statement encapsulates the notion that “even though an individual
knows some attention from others is likely [in public], the level of
scrutiny the person expects and risks merely by being in public is not the
kind of highly individualized, targeted scrutiny imparted by law
210
enforcement.” Moreover, as the Jackson and Weaver courts did, the
206. Smith, 442 U.S. at 748 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
207. Id. at 751 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745,
786 (1970) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
208. Maynard, 615 F.3d at 562.
209. Id. (quoting CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 178 (1985)). Sims was a case concerning
intelligence sources and focused on the assemblage of data from disparate sources giving rise
to national security concerns. Sims, 471 U.S. at 178 (“[T]he very nature of the intelligence
apparatus of any country is to try and find out the concerns of others; bits and pieces of data
‘may aid in piecing together bits of other information even when the individual piece is not of
obvious importance in itself.’” (internal citation omitted)).
210. Otterberg, supra note 81, at 686; see also Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 338–
39 (2000) (holding that manipulation of a bus passenger’s carry-on bag, above simple
observation, is a search).
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court then elaborated on just how much information could be revealed
211
by tracking an individual’s movements over the course of a month.
Finally, to bolster its constructive exposure analysis, the court pointed to
common law privacy tort violations where prolonged surveillance had
been found actionable and to state court GPS tracking cases where such
practices have been found to reveal an intimate portrait of one’s life,
212
violating a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy.
Closing out the Maynard court’s decision was an analysis of the
second part of the Katz test—whether Jones’s expectation of privacy
was an expectation society is prepared to recognize as reasonable—and
one that has “‘a source outside the Fourth Amendment,’ such as
213
‘understandings that are recognized or permitted by society.’”
To
begin, the court restated that not everything that one does in public has
no constitutional protection, but that one continues to have a “zone” of
214
privacy outside of the home. The court then noted that there can be
no question that prolonged GPS tracking is something society is
prepared to recognize as a violation of an individual’s reasonable
expectation of privacy because this type of intrusion “stands in stark
contrast to the relatively brief intrusion at issue in Knotts; indeed it
exceeds the intrusions occasioned by every police practice the Supreme
215
Court has deemed a search under Katz.” The court then pointed to
“nationwide ‘societal understandings’” of GPS monitoring’s privacy
implications by looking at state law restrictions on the use of GPS
tracking and state court holdings that GPS tracking is a violation of the
216
Fourth Amendment (or state constitutions).
Finally, and in lieu of
creating precedent even more in conflict with other federal circuits, the
court distinguished prolonged visual surveillance from its holding,
stating that “just as the Supreme Court in Knotts reserved the lawfulness
of prolonged beeper surveillance, we reserve the lawfulness of

211. See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
212. Maynard, 615 F.3d at 562–63.
213. Id. at 563 (quoting United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 123 n.22 (1984)); see
also Hutchins, supra note 35, at 428 (“A personal desire for privacy, no matter how earnestly
held, does not trigger Fourth Amendment protection unless the desire is one that society is
prepared to embrace as reasonable.”).
214. Maynard, 615 F.3d at 563.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 564.
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217

prolonged visual surveillance.”

V. WHY THE MAYNARD COURT IS MOVING IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION
A. The Need for Change
The Supreme Court has stated that “[t]he judiciary risks error by
elaborating too fully on the Fourth Amendment implications of
218
emerging technology before its role in society has become clear.”
However, it is hard to argue that GPS’s role within society is muddled at
this point considering its use within the military, the citizenry, and by
219
law enforcement.
GPS is now installed in nearly all new cellphones
220
and is a feature available in automobiles with OnStar. There has also
been a substantial upward trend in its use as a stand-alone device for
221
travel assistance. Its widespread use cannot be understated, and this
prevalence has been noted by many of the courts that have been faced
222
with GPS tracking Fourth Amendment questions.
More alarmingly,
217. Id. at 566. The reservation of the visual surveillance issue was one focal point when
the case went up for rehearing. United States v. Jones, 625 F.3d 766, 769 (D.C. Cir. 2010)
(Sentelle, C.J., dissenting) (noting that the court’s aggregation approach provides no
distinction “between the supposed invasion by aggregation of data [by] GPS-augmented
surveillance and . . . purely visual surveillance of substantial length”), cert. granted, United
States v. Jones, 131 S. Ct. 3064 (2011), aff’d on other grounds, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
218. City of Ontario, Cal. v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2629 (2010).
219. See Buchok, supra note 27, at 1019–26. GPS is also the legislated method of choice
for tracking sex offenders, for life, in a multitude of states, including California. See, e.g.,
Sarah Shekhter, Note, Every Step You Take, They’ll Be Watching You: The Legal and
Practical Implications of Lifetime GPS Monitoring of Sex Offenders, 38 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 1085, 1085–92 (2011).
220. OnStar itself has become embroiled in a privacy-related GPS tracking issue. See
Kashmir Hill, GM’s Boneheaded Privacy Mistake with OnStar, FORBES (Sept. 26, 2011),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2011/09/26/gms-boneheaded-privacy-mistake-withonstar/ (reporting that OnStar indicated in a new privacy agreement that they would continue
to track cars with the system installed, even after the owners had cancelled OnStar). Senator
Chuck Shumer called for an FTC investigation to the practice, saying “‘[b]y tracking drivers
even after they’ve cancelled their service, OnStar is attempting one of the most brazen
invasions of privacy in recent memory.’” Sen. Charles Schumer, Schumer Calls on OnStar to
Immediately Stop Tracking Former Customers and Refrain From Selling Drivers’ Data; Calls
on FTC to Investigate, SENATE.GOV (Sept. 26, 2011), http://schumer.senate.gov/Newsroom/
record.cfm?id=334193.
221. See Buchok, supra note 27, at 1026. For a dystopian perspective on the
pervasiveness of GPS technology (and how the government could potentially use it), see
United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 617 F.3d 1120, 1125 (2010) (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting),
petition for cert. filed, No. 10-7515 (U.S. Nov. 10, 2010).
222. Pineda-Moreno, 617 F.3d at 1126; United States v. Marquez, 605 F.3d 604, 610 (8th
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GPS’s use within law enforcement appears to be growing. The risk we
continually run by letting Knotts stand as nearly the only defining
precedent governing GPS is that we are equating an antiquated
technology (the beeper) with something massively more sophisticated
224
and capable of gathering a larger amount of data. Thus, to reserve an
opinion on GPS much longer is to “transform[] from mere assertion to
self-fulfilling prophecy the government’s contention that people
categorically lack any reasonable expectation of privacy” when it comes
to not only GPS, but also other emerging and maybe not yet as
225
While the Maynard decision has been
prevalent technologies.
criticized for using Knotts “as an escape hatch” to craft an entire new
226
way to approach the GPS tracking problem, that escape was necessary
to reinterpret Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in a manner that
adequately addresses emerging technology.
Maynard succeeds in addressing technology by viewing privacy not
wholly within the constrained notions of the Fourth Amendment but
Cir. 2010) (noting, as observed in Garcia, that with respect to GPS, “the cost of the
technology is decreasing while the ability of police to monitor and install such devices is
increasing”); United States v. Sparks, 750 F. Supp. 2d 384, 392 (D. Mass. 2010) (“[W]ith the
proliferation of private GPS use . . . it is unconvincing to argue that society is completely
unaware of the power of these devices.”); People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195, 1200 (N.Y.
2009) (“GPS [is] becoming an increasingly routine feature in cars and cell phones.”).
223. See Appellee’s Petition for Rehearing En Banc, supra note 8, at 2 n.1 (“GPS
tracking is an important law-enforcement tool. Investigative agents of the United States
Department of Justice employ this method of surveillance with great frequency.”). The
government has also made clear that they believe they are not abusing GPS technology. Brief
for the United States at 14–15, United States v. Jones, 131 S. Ct. 3064 (2011) (No 10-1259).
224. See State v. White, 5th Dist. No. 2010-CA-60, 2011-Ohio-4526, at ¶ 49 (Ohio Ct.
App. Sept. 1, 2011) (“The argument that [GPS devices] only augment[] that which can
admittedly be done by visual surveillance is feckless.”); see also Hutchins, supra note 35, at
453–54; Otterberg, supra note 81, at 694–95. Ironically, the Fifth Circuit distinguished
Maynard in a recent case involving GPS tracking in part by arguing that despite the tracking
occurring over a cross-country trip, the GPS tracker that was used was apparently less
sophisticated, and thus equated the GPS device with the beeper in Knotts. United States v.
Hernandez, 647 F.3d 216, 220–21 (5th Cir. 2011).
225. In re App. of U.S. for Order Authorizing the Release of Historical Cell-Site Info.,
736 F. Supp. 2d 578, 595 (E.D.N.Y. 2010); see also Spencer, supra note 180, at 912–13 (“The
privacy battle is to be won or lost not by theoretical argument about the nature of privacy, but
by concrete action . . . .”).
226. Kerr, D.C. Circuit, supra note 181 (“The [Maynard] opinion seems to use that
‘dragnet’ section from Knotts as an escape hatch: And once it’s free, nothing from Knotts is
relevant anymore.”). See generally United States v. Jones, 625 F.3d 766 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert.
granted, United States v. Jones, 131 S. Ct. 3064 (2011), aff’d on other grounds, 132 S. Ct. 945
(2012).
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also allowing conceptions of privacy within other bodies of law to be
227
instructive. The invocation of “mosaic theory” is no more novel than
the concept that law enforcement cannot merely go on a fishing
228
expedition, looking for evidence while impinging on privacy rights.
And the hard question left unanswered by the Ninth and Seventh
Circuit interpretations is how long is too long before GPS tracking
becomes offensive even to those courts? Maynard has also been
criticized as leaving too amorphous a precedent, leaving the
reasonableness determination of GPS tracking (and of other
229
technologies) and how it all fits into the “mosaic” up to the judiciary.
But this argument is untenable because it requires that we should
forsake progress in lieu of judicial certainty, which is almost never
230
attainable.
Additionally, the issue with “solving” the GPS tracking
problem by merely adopting the precedent established in Garcia and
227. See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Reunifying Privacy Law, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 2007, 2038
(2010) (“The Maynard opinion’s embrace of a coherent body of information privacy law was
more complete than anything written since Warren and Brandeis’s time.”). Strahilevitz goes
on to say that
Maynard . . . does not take the position that reasonable expectations of privacy
in tort law, FOIA, and other non-Fourth Amendment contexts are the same as
those arising under the Fourth Amendment. It only takes the position that such
precedents are instructive, and can be used to get a handle on the Fourth
Amendment issues presented by relatively novel technologies.
Id. at 2041.
228. See Wilkins, supra note 34, at 1129 (“Thus, [F]ourth [A]mendment protection does
not depend solely upon a finding of a particular intrusion into a defined place to obtain
specified information. Rather, as Katz itself held, a ‘search’ occurs when government probing
for information intrudes upon fundamental concepts of personal intimacy and privacy.”).
229. See Kerr, D.C. Circuit, supra note 181. The workability of Maynard was one of the
key issues recently before the Court in United States v. Jones. Compare Brief for the United
States, supra note 223 (using the word “unworkable” four times in its brief), with Brief for
Respondent at 45, supra note 89 (arguing that Maynard is workable, but even if it is not, “the
answer is not to unleash unchecked government GPS monitoring and recording. The answer
is to hold that any GPS monitoring is a search.”). However, in its decision the Court did not
analyze the workability of the Maynard rule. 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). Justice Sotomayor
concurred and Justice Alito concurred in the judgment with three Justices joining. Id. at 954
(Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 957 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice Alito,
while adopting the principles underpinning Maynard, only obliquely confronted the
workability of the Maynard rule. Id. at 962–64 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice
Sotomayor did not confront Maynard’s workability. Id. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
230. See generally Kerr, Four Models, supra note 57 (positing why the Supreme Court
cannot—or should not—develop a definition of or test for “reasonable expectation of
privacy”).

13-WEBB.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2011–2012]

3/20/2012 2:08 PM

CAR-VING OUT NOTIONS OF PRIVACY

791
231

Pineda-Moreno is that we still have not moved forward.
Both
decisions continue to adhere blindly to Knotts, holding fast to the
blanket assertion that anything that is done in public is not subject to a
232
reasonable expectation of privacy. And, both Karo and Kyllo provide
limited insight into this problem because they too continue to facilitate
this “inside/out distinction,” where what one does inside is entitled to
constitutional protection, but all else gives rise to no reasonable
233
expectation of privacy.
As we continue to grapple with this distinction in constitutional
coverage arising out of physical space, we will undoubtedly revisit the
234
issue anew as a functionally equivalent problem erupts in cyberspace.
235
Moreover, as technology moves forward, we will trade pen registers,
236
237
flashlights, and phone taps for online surveillance, Radio Frequency
Identification tags, and technologies that will abolish the physical
238
And finally, data aggregation and
inside/out distinction altogether.
prolonged surveillance issues will rise in prevalence as sophisticated
technology for doing such aggregation and analysis continues to
advance. It is inescapable that the framers could not have contemplated
the type of technology that the Fourth Amendment must now grapple

231. United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212 (9th Cir. 2010), reh’g en banc
denied, 617 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2010), petition for cert. filed, No. 10-7515 (U.S. Nov. 10, 2010);
United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994 (7th Cir. 2007).
232. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983). Judge Flaum of the Seventh
Circuit has held to this position as well, but noted that “[i]f the doctrine needs clarifying,
tweaking, or an overhaul in light of technologies employed by law enforcement,” that should
be done by the Supreme Court and is “above our pay grade.” United States v. Cuevas-Perez,
640 F.3d 272, 276 (7th Cir. 2011) (Flaum, J., concurring).
233. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001); United States v. Karo, 486 U.S. 705
(1984). Kerr asserts that “[t]he distinction between government surveillance outside and
government surveillance inside is probably the foundational distinction in Fourth
Amendment law.” Kerr, Applying the Fourth Amendment, supra note 88, at 1010; see also
Kerr, D.C. Circuit, supra note 181.
234. See generally Kerr, Applying the Fourth Amendment, supra note 88.
235. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
236. See Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 739–40 (1983) (holding that use of a flashlight to
look at a darkened area was not a search under the Fourth Amendment).
237. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
238. One concern regarding technology’s movement and privacy is that the Supreme
Court’s pace is not progressing equally. See Kerr, New Technologies, supra note 30, at 868–
69. But see Solove, supra note 30, at 768–73 (noting that the judiciary, not the legislature, is
better suited to keep up with technological advances).

13-WEBB.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

792

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

3/20/2012 2:08 PM

[95:751

239

with, nor could one argue that the Knotts Court possessed the
240
foresight to portend where we (and technology) would be in 2012.
B. A Framework to “Futur-ize” the Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
and How Maynard Fits
So where do we go from here? First, and concededly, the judiciary
cannot and should not react to every changing aspect in the landscape of
technology. When confronted with these problems after they have
properly matured, as is the case with GPS surveillance, courts must in
241
some way fashion their decision normatively. Societal expectations of
privacy are driven by not only the social atmosphere and practices with
242
regard to a technology but also how the judiciary speaks on that issue.
Commentators and the general populace continue to lament the erosion
243
These notions cannot
of privacy as technology marches forward.
merely be informative, but must drive the way in which the judiciary
crafts remedies to this erosion.
The Maynard court squarely addressed the normative issue by
attempting to divine “nationwide ‘societal understandings’” through
analysis of statutory regulation of GPS in the states as well as “the
considered judgments of every court to which the issue has been

239. See Hutchins, supra note 35, at 430 (noting new technology is not something the
Framers could have envisioned); see also SLOBOGIN, supra note 22, at 205 (arguing that
“Supreme Court case law construing the Fourth Amendment, broadly read, allows
government agents to . . . continuously track our public movements with cameras and beepers
. . . at their discretion. It is inconceivable that the drafters of the Constitution meant
government to have such uncabined power. If that is the import of its decisions, the Supreme
Court has done this country a vast disservice.”).
240. For example, Knotts was decided in 1983. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276
(1983). GPS technology was not made available to the public at large until 1996, by order of
President Bill Clinton. Presidential Decision Directive NSTC-6 (March 28, 1996); see also
United States v. Cuevas-Perez, 640 F.3d 272, 290 (7th Cir. 2011) (Wood, J., dissenting)
(noting that the GPS device used in that case is “a device whose capabilities are so far beyond
anything the Court saw in Knotts that we have difference in kind, not just a difference in
degree”).
241. See Solove, supra note 17, at 1142 (“Without a normative component, a conception
of privacy can only provide a status report on existing privacy norms rather than guide us
toward shaping privacy law and policy in the future.”). See generally Spencer, supra note 180
(examining how the predominate framework of privacy law promotes the disintegration of
privacy).
242. Spencer, supra note 180, at 850–51.
243. Id. at 873–78.
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244

squarely presented.”
While these two sources are not fully
representative of societal norms, they do at least embody some
inclination of how representative government has legislated on the issue,
245
and how state courts have wrestled with the problem. Additionally, it
is hard to argue that privacy norms are not shifting, based on the recent
proposal of federal legislation to protect against unwarranted GPS
246
tracking, the unrelated-but-germane public outcry that occurred when
people realized that their cell phone operating system was keeping a
record of everywhere they went via GPS (a concept more innocuous
247
than “Big Brother” doing so), and the bipartisan efforts to offer
248
guidance and solutions to the problem.
244. United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 562 (D.C. Cir. 2010), reh’g denied en banc
sub nom. United States v. Jones, 625 F.3d 766 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 671
(2010), cert. granted sub nom. United States v. Jones, 131 S. Ct. 3064 (2011), and aff’d on other
grounds, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
245. However, some have argued that state court conception and societal views have
been foreclosed as influences on the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. See
Kerr, D.C. Circuit, supra note 181 (noting that the Maynard court’s “reliance on state laws for
its view that the expectation of privacy is reasonable seems plainly foreclosed by Virginia v.
Moore and California v. Greenwood”).
246. See supra notes 29–30 and accompanying text.
247. Apple and Google were discovered to be tracking user locations and transmitting
that information back to the companies, igniting public concern over personal privacy. See
Byron Acohido, Lawmakers Request Probe of Tracking by Apple and Google, USA TODAY,
Apr. 24, 2011, http://www.usatoday.com/money/usaedition/2011-04-25-iPhone-Tracking_
ST_U.htm. Officials from both companies were brought in front of Congress to testify about
the tracking. Jim Puzzanghera, Apple, Google Officials Testify, L.A. TIMES, May 11, 2011, at
B1. Senator Leahy’s statements from that panel are indicative of the growing public concern:
Like many Americans, I am deeply concerned about the recent reports that the
Apple iPhone, Google Android Phone and other mobile applications may be
collecting, storing, and tracking user location data without the user’s consent. . . .
They have good reason to be concerned. The collection, use and storage of
location and other sensitive personal information has serious implications regarding
the privacy rights and personal safety of American consumers.
Protecting Mobile Privacy: Your Smartphones, Tablets, Cell Phones and Your Privacy Before
the S. Sub. Comm. on Privacy, Technology and the Law, 112th Cong. (2011) (statement of
Sen. Patrick Leahy).
248. A bi-partisan group of legal experts and former law enforcement officers has
agreed with Maynard’s interpretation in principle, and called for limits on how police can use
GPS. See CONST. PROJECT LIBERTY & SEC. COMM., supra note 20, at 3–7. The report states
that “[a] warrant based on probable cause should be required before law enforcement may
seek GPS or other electronic location tracking information for a period extending beyond 24
hours.” Id. at 5–6; Emily Babay, Report Urges Limits on Police Use of GPS Tracking, WASH.
EXAMINER (Sept. 22, 2011), http://washingtonexaminer.com/local/crime-punishment/2011/09
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Second, a judicial conception of the reasonable expectation of
privacy must adequately address the amount of information that can
potentially be gathered about a person through various forms of
technology—with some limiting function that articulates a reasonable
249
duration of time over which data collection can occur. It is generally
conceded that GPS can function to gather an inordinate amount of
250
Thus, as
intimate information and for a significant duration.
commentator Renee Hutchins has noted, “the extensive database of
information collectable through the use of GPS-enabled surveillance
justifies affording some constitutional limitation on police use of the
251
technology.” And addressing time duration, Hutchins has argued that
“it is entirely consistent with existing precedent to understand the level
of proof required from one who challenges covert tracking as bearing an
inverse relationship to the length of time such surveillance is
252
conducted.”
The Maynard court’s “mosaic theory” was successful in addressing
the amount of information that GPS could potentially reap and, to some
253
extent, the duration issue.
The court recognized that prolonged
surveillance could paint an “intimate picture of the subject’s life that he
254
expects no one to have—short perhaps of his spouse.” By invoking a
conception of the whole being distinct from the sum of its parts, the
/report-urges-limits-police-use-gps-tracking.
249. See Kerr, D.C. Circuit, supra note 181.
implementing Maynard’s precedent:

Kerr offered his skeptical take of

Much of the problem is knowing when the line is crossed when a bunch of nonsearches become a search. The Supreme Court has stressed the need for clear rules
that tell the police what they can and cannot do. But how do the police know when
a mosaic has been created such that the sum of law enforcement techniques, when
aggregated, amount to a search? Are they supposed to carry around a D.H.
Ginsburg Aggregatormeter that tells them when it’s time to get a warrant? Take
the case of Maynard. One-month of surveillance is too long, the court says. But
how about 2 weeks? 1 week? 1 day? 1 hour? I have no idea.
Id.
250. See supra text accompanying note 174; United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 562
(D.C. Cir. 2010), reh’g denied en banc sub nom. United States v. Jones, 625 F.3d 766 (D.C.
Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 671 (2010), cert. granted sub nom. United States v. Jones,
131 S. Ct. 3064 (2011), and aff’d on other grounds, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
251. Hutchins, supra note 35, at 458.
252. Id. at 455; see also Otterberg, supra note 81, at 697–98.
253. Maynard, 615 F.3d at 562.
254. Id. at 563.
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court was able to address both data aggregation as well as correlation.
This “mosaic” formula divorces the qualitative component of evidence
from its quantitative component, so that its impact can be measured in
256
its component parts and method of acquisition.
It facilitates the
reasonable notion that one “do[es] not expect that for weeks or months
at a time the various bits and pieces of [his or her] daily routine will be
woven together in an unbroken stream” to divine likely relevant, but
257
unquestionably intrusive, things about his or her life.
What the
“mosaic” does not do, admittedly, is denote a time-frame over which use
of GPS transforms an acceptable law enforcement practice into a Fourth
Amendment search. While this is a weakness of adopting “mosaic
theory” to Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, it is no more amorphous
258
And,
than the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test itself.
arguably, what the Maynard court’s holding lacks in specificity, it makes
up for two-fold in flexibility.
Third, the reasonable expectation of privacy standard must be
pushed past the “inside/out” problem and become a forward-thinking
approach to encapsulate all new technologies that might possibly
259
emerge.
As commentator Orin Kerr concedes, “the inside/outside
distinction operates sensibly in a physical investigation governed by
260
human eyesight.” Society has moved outside of these limited bounds
with GPS because GPS can do what law enforcement practically cannot
261
do—real-time, round-the-clock surveillance. While Katz did provide a
shift away from bright line boundaries between public and private, this
shift has not been sufficient. GPS tracking, more than any technology
widely used, “highlight[s] the need for the Fourth Amendment to offer
255. Id. at 561–62.
256. The government contends, however, that aggregation of a lot of information is
often the goal in an investigation. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 223, at 32. The government
also argues that “mosaic” theory “has the potential to destabilize Fourth Amendment law and
to raise questions about a variety of common law-enforcement practices.” Id.
257. Hutchins, supra note 35, at 455.
258. Katz, along with the entire body of Fourth Amendment law, has been criticized for
its lack of clarity. See supra text accompanying note 57.
259. See supra text accompanying note 233.
260. See Kerr, Applying the Fourth Amendment, supra note 88, at 1011.
261. See Otterberg, supra note 81, at 667–68 (“[GPS] can last for weeks at a time . . .
[and] police could acquire constant, real-time, precise location information about that vehicle
for much longer than they practically might be able to maintain round-the-clock visual
surveillance.”).
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262

protection even within the public space.” One functional method of
addressing the “inside/out” problem is to view the data collectively, not
based on location, but on the information it reveals. Undoubtedly, the
concern an individual has in privacy is equated less with where the data
was gathered and more with what that data divulges. The Maynard
court’s holding is most successful in addressing the “inside/out” problem
that has dogged Fourth Amendment jurisprudence ad nauseum. The
court’s holding does what Kyllo could not: it provides “essential
guidance” to address situations in the future that have been foretold in a
line of Supreme Court cases that have dealt with technology and the
263
Fourth Amendment.
The Maynard court’s holding does not falter
when presented with a novel place from which to gain evidence, or a
novel method for doing so. Its focal point is on the amount of
information that is revealed about the subject through the component
parts of evidence. It gives judicial authority to contemplate whether the
evidence presented reveals information to a degree no one could have
contemplated as a reasonable matter because of the scope, amount, and
method used to gather it—if so, then the process by which it was
264
obtained was a search under the Fourth Amendment.
Moreover, it
facilitates “a Fourth Amendment analysis better equipped to handle
changes brought about by technology [that] focus[es] less on physical
boundaries and more on whether allowing the law enforcement practice
at issue would alter the degree of privacy experienced by society before
265
the technology existed.”
VI. CONCLUSION
266

While there may be other judicial solutions to GPS tracking,

the

262. Id. at 694.
263. See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 36 (2001) (“[T]he rule we adopt must
take account of more sophisticated systems that are already in use or in development.”).
Justice Stevens’ dissent in Kyllo called into question the holding’s “essential guidance.” Id. at
46 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
264. See Gershman, supra note 51, at 958 (asserting that with GPS monitoring “there can
be a legally significant difference in terms of the degree, scope, and duration of an intrusion
into privacy”).
265. See Otterberg, supra note 81, at 699.
266. The government does offer an alternative solution in its Brief for United States v.
Jones, arguing that even if the use of GPS was a search or seizure, it could still be justified
under the Supreme Court’s “general Fourth Amendment approach.” Brief for the United
States, supra note 223, at 47–52 (quoting Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 848 (2006)).
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Maynard court’s focus on the method and type of information to
determine a violation of a reasonable expectation of privacy is a move in
the right direction.
A novel approach to Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence is direly needed to confront the challenges that
technology will continue to bring. Additionally, if the judiciary
continues to bury its head in the metaphorical sand of Knotts while the
complexity of systems that can be used to track an individual increases,
society will be self-propagating the waves of advancement against an
individual’s zone of privacy. Soon, the bubble of autonomy that
individuals cling to as a fundamental right will be washed away, the
267
Fourth Amendment’s historical meaning will be significantly diluted,
and this inaction will unwittingly facilitate a normative shift in the
conception of privacy that may not be undone.
*

JUSTIN P. WEBB

This balancing approach entails weighing the degree of the intrusion (search or seizure) on an
individual’s privacy against the need for promoting a legitimate governmental interest.
United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118–19 (2001); see also CLANCY, supra note 33, at
489–507. However, the government’s argument is flatly untenable because the majority of
cases it is based on involve specialized situations not requiring a warrant because of their
unique nature. See Samson, 547 U.S. at 850 (parolees have a diminished expectation of
privacy); United States v. Flores-Mantano, 541 U.S. 149, 152–53 (2004) (noting that the
expectation of privacy at the border is diminished, and “[t]he Government’s interest in
preventing the entry of unwanted persons and effects is at its zenith at the international
border”); Knights, 534 U.S. at 119–20 (probationers have a diminished expectation of
privacy); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 348 (1985) (students have lesser expectation of
privacy in school and warrant requirement would be unworkable). It is unclear if this
argument will even be considered, since it was not used in the lower courts. Brief for
Respondent, supra note 89, at 54–55.
267. The meaning of the Fourth Amendment has been described in various ways;
however, Professor Taslitz’s description of one of the Fourth Amendment’s expressive
functions is particularly applicable:
[T]he Fourth Amendment can be seen as serving yet a final expressive function:
educating the People in the necessity for individualized justice based on . . . the
need to restrain all three branches of government, as well as the People themselves,
from exercising arbitrary power over others’ lives, privacy, property, and
locomotion. For the state to treat any person as less than a unique individual
entitled to be free from governmental intrusions absent significant evidence of his
wrongdoing violates the terms of the American social contract.
ANDREW E. TASLITZ, RECONSTRUCTING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: A HISTORY OF
SEARCH AND SEIZURE, 1789–1869, at 44 (2006).
* J.D. expected, 2013, Marquette University Law School; B.S., 2003, UCLA. I would
like to thank my beautiful wife Sara, who has loved me (and the ghost of me while I wrote
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this), unconditionally. I am forever blessed by the love and support of my parents and
brother, as well, and I could not have crafted this without Professor Alison Julien’s guidance.
I dedicate this piece to friends lost, but not forgotten.

